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Dissertation Abstract
Assessing the association among hospital ownership, penalties assessed under the Hospital
Readmissions Reduction Program, and 30-day risk standardized mortality rates for selected
conditions, 2016-2018
By
Jennifer M. Carmona

Advisor: Elizabeth Eastwood, Ph.D.

Background: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) is an aspect of Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. HRRP requires Medicare to reduce
payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates. While the implementation of the
program has been accompanied by reductions in readmission rates, some have expressed
concerns about unintended consequences, including harm to patient care and even death.
Under HRRP, hospitals serving a high proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged patients,
like public hospitals, have been more likely to receive financial penalties, potentially impeding
their ability to invest resources in improving patient outcomes. There is previous research on
the relationship between hospital ownership and quality of care as well as between hospital
ownership and patient outcomes. There is also research on the relationship between HRRP
implementation and mortality. This project is distinguished by its focus on the relationship
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between penalties assessed under HRRP and 30-day risk standardized mortality rate (RSMR)
modified by hospital ownership.
Methods: To estimate the odds that a hospital incurring a penalty performs worse than the
national 30-day RSMR for each condition (Aim 1), I conducted multiple logistic regression
analyses for each condition separately for each year. To estimate the association between
penalty and RSMR compared by hospital ownership (Aim 2), I conducted multiple linear
regression analysis stratified by ownership for each condition separately for each year as well as
multivariate linear regression analysis with fixed effects to examine change in RSMR for a given
hospital. A multiple linear regression with a term representing the interaction of hospital
ownership type and payment adjustment as well as multivariate linear regression with fixed
effects was conducted for Aim 3.
Results: Multiple logistic regression showed that, with some exceptions, penalization was
generally associated with a decrease in the odds of exceeding the RSMR. However, the
relationship was significant only for COPD in 2016, 2017, and 2018 and heart failure in 2016 and
2017. Hospital ownership, on the other hand, was, with one exception, associated with
increases in the odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR for publicly owned hospitals across all
conditions and all years with significance for AMI in 2016 and 2017, heart failure in 2017 and
2018, and pneumonia in 2018. Under the stratified multiple linear regression analyses, average
penalties were consistently associated with significant percentage point reductions in the
average 30-day RSMR for COPD over all measurement periods for all three types of hospital
ownership. Although not all of the associations were significant, average penalties were also
consistently associated with percentage point reductions in the average RSMR for heart failure
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across hospital ownership types. However, under the fixed effects model, each percentage
point increase in average penalty was associated with a significant 0.49 percentage point
increase in the heart failure RSMR for any given public hospital. Examining the interaction of
hospital ownership with average penalty and its association with 30-day RSMR through a
multiple linear regression of 30-day RSMR by condition for each year and a multivariate linear
regression of 30-day RSMR with fixed effects found some consistency between the two models.
For public hospitals, the directions of the associations were uniformly positive for CABG (which
was significant in 2018 as well as under the fixed effects model). In the case of heart failure
RSMR, however, the direction of the association reversed. Under the linear regression
conducted for each year, there was an inverse relationship between average penalty and heart
failure RSMR among public hospitals. Under the fixed effects model, each additional
percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with a significant 0.51 point
increase in heart failure RSMR.
Conclusions: Results from the stratified linear regression, which found that the average penalty
was significantly associated with decreases in RSMR for COPD across all hospital types for all
years, initially reinforced results from the logistic regression model which found penalization
significantly associated with a decrease in the odds of exceeding the RSMR. While not as
consistently significant, results under the logistic regression and the stratified linear models for
some other conditions, like heart failure, suggested that perhaps some conditions were more
responsive than others to quality initiatives. Tests of the interaction of hospital ownership with
average penalty rarely demonstrated that the association between penalization and RSMR
varied significantly by ownership type. Analyses employing fixed effects found that the
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regression of RSMR on penalization stratified by ownership as well as that on the interaction of
hospital ownership with penalization was significant for heart failure among public hospitals.
But, the reversal of the direction of the associations suggested that failure to control for timeinvariant characteristics may not sufficiently characterize the effect of penalties on 30-day
RSMR.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), launched in 2013, is an aspect of
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. HRRP requires Medicare to reduce
payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates (i.e. rates of unplanned
readmissions 30 days after initial hospitalization) for patients in Medicare.1–8 The conditions
initially included in the program were acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure (the
leading cause of readmissions among Medicare beneficiaries),9 and pneumonia.2 In 2015, the
list of conditions expanded to include patients with acute exacerbation of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD) and elective surgery for hip and knee replacement.2 In 2017, the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) added the procedure coronary artery bypass
graft (CABG) to the list. Conditions are identified based on primary discharge diagnosis and
hospitals must have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis to be measured.2,5
While the implementation of the program has been accompanied by reductions in
readmission rates,10 some have expressed concerns about unintended consequences, including
harm to patient care and even death.4,6,8,9,11–13 Introducing incentives to reduce readmissions
may motivate health care providers to use inappropriate care strategies, such as discouraging
triage for emergency care or delaying readmissions.9 However, the evidence for mortality
associated with HRRP is mixed. Some investigators found that reductions in hospital
readmission rates were correlated with reductions in mortality rates, others found that
implementation of the HRRP was associated with a subsequent decrease readmissions and an
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increase in mortality, and still others found that decreases in readmissions had no significant
impact on mortality.7,9,12,14
Under HRRP, hospitals serving a high proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients, like public hospitals, have been more likely to receive financial penalties, potentially
impeding their ability to invest resources in improving patient outcomes.13,15 If these hospitals
find that their ability to provide care is hindered as a result of financial penalties, the potential
for harm exists even when there is little or no change in readmissions.7 Public hospitals may
find it particularly challenging to address causes of readmissions. Penalties for readmissions
may further strain their limited resources, inhibiting their ability to invest in effective transitions
of care programs or other efforts to improve care quality and patient outcomes.4,11,13 The
project presented here offers accessible lessons learned from the early years of HRRP about the
consequences of pay-for-performance programs for hospitals and communities to inform
future directions for this and other similar initiatives.

1.2 Hospital ownership and HRRP
Previous research suggests a relationship among hospital ownership, quality of care, and
patient outcomes.5,16–22 Ownership may also influence how hospitals respond to the incentives
introduced by HRRP.17 This may be due to the influence that ownership has on motivations for
providing care.17–29 For example, as for-profit institutions, for-profit hospitals seek to maximize
the generation of profits for shareholders by offering relatively profitable medical services.21,27
Government hospitals are likely to offer relatively unprofitable services; non-profits often fall
In the middle.21 Non-profit hospitals seek to maximize output to the point of “breaking
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even”.20,30,31 Similarly, public hospitals also seek to maximize output but, they are also
motivated to maximize welfare (i.e. more likely than for-profit hospitals, for example, to
provide uncompensated care).24,31–33
If penalized under HRRP, for-profit hospitals may be motivated to dedicate resources
that otherwise would have counted toward profits to, instead, reduce readmissions. Assuming
that resources are allocated to improving care quality, patient outcomes may also improve.
This argument presumes that, if not penalized, for-profit hospitals have no incentive to improve
care quality, leaving patient outcomes unchanged. But, research suggests that, as for-profit
institutions, such hospitals often invest in administrative strategies like offloading less
profitable services or marketing services to more desirable patients.26,28,29 Rather than
improving care quality or related outcomes, such approaches may contribute to reductions in
overall costs – and compensate for potential penalties – while leaving quality of care and
patient outcomes unchanged.
Non-profit hospitals seek to maximize both quantity and quality of services (or output)
to the break-even point.20,30,31 HRRP creates incentives for them to reduce readmissions to the
extent that doing so does not result in a deficit. Nonprofit hospitals may allocate resources to
reduce readmissions by improving care quality (and, therefore, outcomes) subject to the
constraint of breaking even (which may mean adjusting the quantity of services in order to
maximize both quantity and quality).30 If penalized under HRRP, non-profit hospitals have less
slack to pursue non-pecuniary goals.31 They may try to reallocate existing resources but, with
less to go around, patient outcomes may be adversely affected if quality of care suffers. If not
penalized, resource allocation may remain unchanged or may even increase.
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Public hospitals are more like non-profit than for-profit hospitals in that they seek to
maximize output but, they are also motivated to maximize welfare.24,31 Horwitz found that
public hospitals were significantly more likely to offer unprofitable services than either forprofit hospitals or non-profit hospitals.21 In response to HRRP, they may implement strategies
to reduce readmissions constrained only by the resources available to them, allocating
resources to improve care quality to the extent that welfare is maximized. If public hospitals
find themselves with fewer resources due to HRRP penalties, they may choose to scale back
some activities – like indigent care – that maximize welfare but come at a cost. However, public
hospitals may also obtain government subsidies not available to either for-profit or non-profit
hospitals to make up for the shortfall.16,24,34 The consequences for patient outcomes depend
upon whether the penalty results in fewer resources overall for care quality. If not penalized,
resource allocation may remain unchanged or may even increase. In the presence of subsidies
unavailable to either for-profit or non-profit hospitals, patient outcomes may even be better.
Researchers and advocacy groups have raised concerns that hospitals, wary of financial
penalties, might deter the readmission of patients requiring inpatient care, thereby increasing
mortality after discharge.5,21,23,53,5412 Penalties and bonuses under HRRP are related solely to
readmissions, not mortality.12,15 Research examining the relationship between hospital
readmission and mortality rates has yielded inconsistent results.9,12–14 It is possible that
strategies designed to lower readmissions through improved hospital, transitional, and postacute care may have reduced both readmission and mortality rates following
hospitalization.12,13 However, ownership may influence the strategies that hospitals adopt
which may or may not be compatible with improving care quality.
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Penalties under HRRP may disproportionately affect hospitals, like public hospitals, that
treat high numbers of poor patients.2,35,36 Safety net hospitals, including public hospitals, are
vulnerable to showing poor performance on a number of the standard quality measures being
used in quality-of-care initiatives under ACA; one study found that safety net hospitals had
readmission rates that were 30% above the national average compared with non-safety net
hospitals.37 Hospitals vary in the resources available to invest in the care processes, staff, and
technologies necessary to reduce readmission rates.37,38 Reductions in revenue due to poor
performance on quality indicators, along with the added costs of having to invest and maintain
quality-of-care monitoring, could adversely affect the financial performance of these
hospitals.39
Harm could result even when there is little or no change in readmissions.6,40 If public
hospitals and other safety net institutions are disproportionately penalized by HRRP, they may
find that their ability to provide quality care is diminished, potentially resulting in harm.7 These
hospitals, which care for a larger proportion of patients of low socioeconomic status, may find it
costly to address underlying reasons for readmissions, such as homelessness. Increased
penalties further reduce resources to institutions that are already financially strained, inhibiting
their ability to invest in effective transitions of care programs or other efforts to improve care
quality.4,13
This assumes, though, that losses will not be otherwise compensated. Some theoretical
observations about the responsiveness of public hospitals to financial conditions apply a
property-rights perspective musing that government-owned hospitals have far weaker rights to
the control of their institutions compared to, for example, for-profit hospitals.24 Local
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governments in charge of public hospitals may, for example, respond to increases in revenue by
reducing the taxpayer financing of operations, lowering sensitivity to financial incentives.29
Kane et al. found that public hospitals had higher margins than other safety-net hospitals
because they benefited from support from state and local governments.816 Another analysis of
the utilization of payments under the Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program found
that local governments reduced subsidies to public hospitals by, on average, the same amount
received in DSH payments leaving total revenues unchanged.29 Interestingly, when non-profit
hospitals and for-profit hospitals received DSH payments, they did not necessarily make
investments in care quality. Instead, payments were directed to increase financial holdings.29
However, under HRRP, quality data is made public, exposing to scrutiny attributes that were
formerly non-contractible. Under those circumstances, even hospitals that do not realize a
change in revenue may be motivated to improve care quality.

1.3 Conceptual bases
That ownership drives motivations for providing health care and affects the way
hospitals respond to incentives is a notion shared by other researchers.16–29,35,41,42 Economic
theory provides a conceptual basis for this idea as do theories that focus on organizations,
some of which underpin models for examining hospitals and health care systems.43
Institutional logics, which concern how social and cultural influences drive institutional action,
offer a way to understand how organizations make sense of, and respond to, change.44
Institutional logics are socially constructed, historical patterns of practices, assumptions, values,
beliefs, and rules by which individuals operate and make sense of their social system.44,45 They

6

form the organizing principles for institutionalized practices in social systems, shaping as well as
constraining organizational actions and outcomes.46
Institutional logics may be changed by critical events which alter institutional
arrangements and trigger the re-definition of issues.46 Critical events are dramatic happenings
that draw sustained attention and, by inviting the collective definition and redefinition of social
issues, alter institutional arrangements.46 The Clinton health care reform effort is one such
critical event, receiving sustained public attention and triggering the redefinition of issues
related to the health care system, both in the hospital field and in the public at large.46 In this
way, the ACA may also be viewed as a critical event. Attention to these events may help
explain what influences institutions to change their organization and practices in response.
A realist evaluation approach may help explain the mechanisms through which
institutional logics operate to achieve outcomes related to readmissions. Under a realist
evaluation approach, the relationship between the mechanisms underlying an intervention and
the outcomes produced is contingent upon the context within which the mechanisms
operate.47 The relationship may be expressed by the C-M-O configuration where C represents
the contextual conditions, M represents the underlying mechanisms and O represents the
outcomes.47
The C-M-O configuration proposes a pathway through which hospital ownership (with
their corresponding institutional logics) and payment adjustment (a critical event) are
associated with mortality (Figure 1.1). Hospital ownership, along with policies to promote
quality of care through pay-for-performance reimbursement under the ACA, provide the
context.16,48,49 Ownership has been found to influence hospital financial performance. In
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general, private hospitals produce higher profit margins than public hospitals.16 While this
effect is most consistent among for-profit hospitals, these hospitals also typically face higher
costs for equity capital and may be subject to tax.50 Even so, a 2016 survey of safety net
hospitals found that they operated with margins lower than the rest of the hospital industry
with an average aggregate margin of 4% (hospitals nationwide had a 7.8% operating margin).51
Quality-of-care-related incentives could exacerbate financial disparities between public
hospitals and other types of hospitals in several ways. Improving quality may require investing
resources which public hospitals, as safety-net institutions, lack.48 Safety net hospitals may also
face penalties under incentive systems that reward the highest performers because they have
lower performance at baseline.48 A study by Werner and colleagues found that safety net
hospitals tend to have smaller gains in quality performance measures over three years and
were less likely to be high-performing over time than non–safety net hospitals.48
The proposed mechanisms through which ownership may interact with readmission
penalties to influence outcomes concern institutional logics that are cultural, political, and
financial. For example, public hospitals are often governed by elected officials whose political
interests may influence resource allocation superseding concerns about the performance of
hospitals under their control.16,24 Other rules imposed upon government agencies (concerning,
for example, hiring and procurement) can also adversely affect the performance of public
hospitals.16 Public hospitals may also have benefited from local taxpayer subsidies as well as
supplemental DSH payments which insulated them from pressure imposed by value-based
payment initiatives to improve performance.16,34 Under this framework, hospital ownership
modifies the effects of penalties. Effect measure modification (also known as heterogeneity of
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effect) occurs when the size of the association changes according to the value of a 3rd
variable.52,53
Both economic theory and organizational theory provide helpful ways to think about
why the relationship between payment adjustment and mortality may vary by hospital
ownership. Relying solely on the former, though, may oversimplify understanding by reducing
institutions to abstract representations. The assertion that for-profit hospitals find their
primary motivation in maximizing profits for shareholders ignores that, in the United States,
there are many opportunities to make money and in ways far easier than offering health care
services. Proprietors and employees of for-profit systems may view themselves as playing a key
role in the welfare of communities through the services they provide. Similarly, many nonprofit health care institutions have amassed substantial wealth. While earnings do not accrue
to shareholders, they may allocate resources to amenities or executive compensation while still
subject to the constraint of breaking even. Under these circumstances, it may be difficult to
ascribe a solely charitable motive to their response to incentives. So, as a way of understanding
hospitals and other health care organizations and their responses to health policy, purely
economic models are inadequate – hospitals are complex institutions with interdependent,
multidisciplinary staff whose operations are subject to conditions in the external
environment.43
Organizational theory, on the other hand, offers a way to understand how institutions
respond to change in a way that acknowledges institutional complexity and overall milieu.
According to Thornton and Ocasio, the central logic around which an institution is organized
provides those within the organization with their motivations.44 This dissertation aims to test
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whether ownership lies at the core of the central logic of health care institutions, playing a key
role in shaping hospitals’ responses to HRRP. The role of ownership in shaping motivation for
providing care is a component of institutional logics but so are how ownership determines lines
of accountability and financial resources. As mentioned previously, public hospitals may be
motivated to maximize both output and welfare. As government agencies, they may be
accountable to elected officials who govern them as well as subject to rules that do not apply to
for-profit and non-profit hospitals. State and local budgets may provide financial support for
public hospitals not available to for-profit and non-profit hospitals but such support may be
contingent upon tax revenues or available at the discretion of political leaders.16 Non-profit
hospitals may be motivated to maximize output – in terms of both quantity and quality – to the
point of “breaking even”. Non-profit hospitals may be governed by boards of directors but may
also be accountable to donors or other stakeholders with an interest in institutional prestige or
wealth.24,31 Prestige may also influence the financial resources available to non-profit hospitals
whether from donors or from patients seeking care. For-profit hospitals seek to maximize the
generation of profits for which they are accountable to boards and shareholders. This does not
mean that they are disinterested in serving their communities but they are expected to achieve
a return on investment since some of the financial resources available to for-profit hospitals are
dependent on investors.
Taken together, institutional logics and the realist evaluation approach offer a
theoretical framework for an intuitive observation: that factors intrinsic to the organization as
well as the external environment influence how hospitals respond to HRRP with consequences
for patient-level outcomes. Organizational theory accommodates the complexity of nested
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systems (i.e. individuals within institutions within communities within policy environments) but
too often relies on the jargon of the academy, limiting its utility to key stakeholders in health
care policy (like legislators, professional organizations, and patients) to whom the literature
may be inaccessible.
Viewing this project through the lens of health services research offers an accessible
perspective on the consequences of pay-for-performance programs for hospitals and
communities to inform future directions in health care policy. As an applied, multidisciplinary
approach, health services research examines “how social factors, financing systems,
organizational structures and processes, health technologies, and personal behaviors affect
access to health care, the quality and cost of health care, and ultimately our health and wellbeing.”54,55

1.4 Study aims
The project is intended to test the hypothesis that the association between penalties
assessed through HRRP payment adjustments and care quality (as measured by the 30-day
RSMR for selected conditions and procedures – referred to throughout as conditions – of
interest under HRRP: AMI, heart failure, pneumonia, COPD, and CABG) varies by ownership.
The specific aims were to:
•

Aim 1: Compare the characteristics of hospitals and their counties by ownership and
estimate the likelihood that a hospital incurring a penalty under the HRRP performs worse
than the national rate for 30-day risk standardized mortality rate (RSMR) for conditions
targeted under HRRP.
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•

Aim 2: Among hospitals that are penalized, estimate the strength of the association
between penalties assessed and 30-day RSMR for targeted conditions to examine if the
effects vary by hospital ownership.

•

Aim 3: Among hospitals that are penalized, estimate the association between the
interaction of hospital ownership and penalties assessed and 30-day RSMR for targeted
disease conditions, to examine change as penalties under HRRP were phased in.

1.5 Overview of methods
Data sources
Table 1.1 lists the data sources for the variables used in the analyses. In this project, the
primary outcome variables are CMS’s 30-day risk standardized mortality rates (RSMR) for AMI,
heart failure, pneumonia, COPD, and CABG. These are drawn from CMS Hospital Compare
Complications and Deaths – Hospital (2016-2018) publicly-available datasets.56–58 CMS’s risk
standardized mortality measure is based on data from index admissions over a three-year
period.59–61 For example, the 2016 mortality measure is based on deaths within 30 days from
the start of an index admission from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2015.59 The RSMR is expressed as
a percent and calculated as the ratio of the number of "predicted" deaths to the number of
"expected" deaths at a given hospital, multiplied by the national observed mortality rate. A
lower RSMR indicates lower-than-expected mortality rates while a higher RSMR indicates
higher-than-expected mortality rates.62,63,64
Each hospitals’ payment adjustment (main predictor) under HRRP for each year during
the period are obtained from Kaiser Health News (KHN) which formats payment adjustment
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factor (PAF) data from the CMS Acute Inpatient Prospective Payment System Final Rule (20132017) in convenient, publicly-available .csv files operationalized as the percentage by which
payments are reduced.10,65 The final rule updates Medicare payment policies for hospitals
under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) (the law requires CMS to update
payment rates for IPPS hospitals annually).66
Data representing hospital characteristics (including hospital ownership, the effect
measure modifier) are drawn from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey
proprietary datasets (2013-2017).67–71 To construct the variable for hospital ownership, I
recoded hospitals whose control codes were classified as “Government, Nonfederal” (state,
county, city, city-county, or hospital district or authority) as public. Those whose control codes
were classified as “Nongovernment, not-for-profit” (church-operated, other not-for-profit)
were recoded as private, non-profit. Those whose control codes were classified as “Investorowned (for-profit)” (individual, partnership, corporation) were recoded as for-profit.
Other studies of the relationship between hospital characteristics and performance
under HRRP have examined the influence of teaching hospital status and local socioeconomic
characteristics finding that the majority of hospitals penalized tended to be teaching hospitals
and hospitals serving those with lower socioeconomic status.1,2,17,35 For this reason, selected
covariates were related to these factors. AHA considers hospitals that are members of the
Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH) of the Association of American Medical Colleges as major
teaching hospitals. Data for characteristics (median household income, private health
insurance coverage, public health insurance coverage, percent of county residents below the
poverty level) of the county in which the hospital is located are drawn from American
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Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates 2013-2017.72 The proportion of those with private
health insurance coverage is the proportion of those in the county with employer-based
coverage, directly purchased coverage, or Tricare/military coverage alone or in combination.73
The proportion of those with public health insurance coverage is the proportion of those in the
county with Medicaid/means-tested public coverage alone or in combination.74 The proportion
of those below the poverty level is the proportion of those in the county living below the
poverty level for the past 12 months.75 Median income represents household median
income.76
If reductions in revenue due to HRRP payment adjustments diminish resources such that
hospitals are unable to invest in improving care quality, then the effects would be felt on
admissions corresponding to the period to which the HRRP payment adjustments applied.
Table 1.2 shows the HRRP payment adjustment periods corresponding to their respective 30day RSMR measurement periods. The time periods selected for the covariates (2012-2017 for
AHA Annual Survey database and ACS 5-year estimates 2013-2017) also correspond to the 30day RSMR measurement periods.
Analysis plan
From 2013 to 2017, 3,251 unique hospitals are listed in the payment adjustment files
obtained from KHN. Since data for hospital ownership (the effect measure modifier) are drawn
from the AHA Annual Survey, analyses include only those hospitals participating in the HRRP
that could be matched to the AHA data sets (n=2,041) and only hospitals’ whose ownership
type did not change from 2013 to 2017 which is the period corresponding to the outcome
measures for 2016 to 2018 (n=1927; Figure 1.2). Not all hospitals are part of HRRP. Those that
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are exempt from the program include hospitals in Maryland, hospitals dedicated to specialty
services (e.g. rehabilitation) or specific population (e.g. veterans), and hospitals with fewer
than 25 cases across all HRRP conditions.5 Hospitals listed in the payment adjustment files
were matched to those appearing in the AHA Annual Survey by Medicare provider identifier,
where available. Where the Medicare provider identifier was not available, an identifier was
constructed for hospitals that was a composite of the hospital name, city, and state.
I computed descriptive statistics for each type of hospital by year. Since payment
adjustments under HRRP are applied annually, operationalizing the penalty as the main
predictor variable required computing the average of the penalties applied during the threeyear outcome measurement period. As the RSMR measurement period corresponds to 12
quarters of payment adjustments, I computed the average penalty over 12 quarters. Analyses
employing the average penalty apply only to hospitals whose ownership type did not change
from 2013 to 2017 which is the period corresponding to the outcome measures for 2016 to
2018.
The number of states adopting Medicaid expansion increased during the period
corresponding to the outcome measures for 2016 to 2018.77 For multivariate analyses, the
variable representing whether the hospital’s home state expanded Medicaid is a score ranging
from 0 (expanded Medicaid was not in place at all during the outcome measurement period) to
1 (Medicaid expansion was in place during the entire outcome measurement period). Since
teaching hospital status may also vary during the period corresponding to the outcome
measures, hospitals were assigned the teaching hospital status in place during the midpoint of
the RSMR measurement period. Median income was divided by 1000 so that the coefficient
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may be interpreted as change for each $1,000 increase. Table 1.3 summarizes how variables
for the multivariate analyses were operationalized.
Study design
To estimate the odds that a hospital (i) incurring a penalty performs worse than the
national 30-day RSMR for each condition (Aim 1), I conducted multiple logistic regression
analyses for each condition separately for each year using private, non-profit hospitals as the
reference group.
Logistic regression for Aim 1, FY2016 through FY2018
!""# %& '()''"*+, +-.*%+-/ 30 − "-3 4564 &%7 )%+"*.*%+ 83 3'-7!
= :" + :# <=8/*)! + :$ &%7<7%&*.! + :% 6'"*)-*"& + :' .'-)ℎ*+,!
+ :( *+)%?'! + :) <7*@-.'*+#! + :* <=8/*)*+#! + :+ <%@'7.3! + :, <'+-/*A'"! +B!

To estimate the association between penalty and RSMR modified by hospital ownership
for each condition by year (Aim 2), I conducted multiple linear regression analysis stratified by
ownership for each condition separately for each year as well as multivariate linear regression
analysis with fixed effects to examine change in RSMR for a given hospital with indices for
hospital (i), state (s), and the period for which RSMR was measured (t).78 Longitudinal data
permit analyses of change over time but repeated measures are not independent.79,80 Fixed
effects models accommodate correlated observations.80 Fixed effects models also address bias
due to time-invariant omitted variables at the hospital level and time-varying omitted variables
for the period during which the readmission penalty was assessed.81,82 The model includes
variables representing fixed effects for each individual hospital (!! ), state ($" ), and period for
which RSMR was measured (%# ).
Linear regression for Aim 2, FY2016 through FY2018, stratified by ownership
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Linear regression with fixed effects for Aim 2 stratified by ownership
30 − "-3 4564 &%7 )%+"*.*%+!-.
= :" + :# <'+-/.3! + :$ 6'"*)-*"!-. + :% .'-)ℎ*+,! + :' *+)%?'! + :( <7*@-.'*+#!
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A multivariate linear regression with a term representing the interaction of hospital
ownership type and payment adjustment as well as fixed effects was conducted for Aim 3 using
the interaction of private, non-profit hospital ownership with average penalty as the reference
group.
Linear regression with interaction and fixed effects for Aim 3, FY2016 through FY2018
30 − "-3 4564 &%7 )%+"*.*%+!-.
= :" + :# <=8/*)!/-. + :$ &%7 − <7%&*.!/-. + :% 6'"*)-*"!/-. + :' .'-)ℎ*+,!/-.
+ :( *+)%?'!/-. + :) <7*@-.'*+#!/-. + :* <=8/*)*+#!/-.
+ :+ <%@'7.3!/-. + :, <'+-/.3!/-. + :#" <=8/*)!/-. <'+-/.3!/-.
+ :## &%7 − <7%&*.!/-. <'+-/.3!/-. + C! + 5- + D. + B!-.

1.6 Conclusion
There is previous research on the relationship between hospital ownership and quality
of care as well as between hospital ownership and patient outcomes.5,16–22 There is also
research on the relationship between HRRP implementation and mortality.7,9,12,14 This project
is distinguished by its focus on the relationship between penalties assessed under HRRP and 30day RSMR. Since hospitals may respond to the incentives introduced by HRRP in different ways,
depending upon ownership, this research also examines the interaction of hospital ownership
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and penalty assessed under HRRP associated with 30-day RSMR post-discharge for selected
conditions associated with HRRP. Understanding how hospitals vary may improve their
capacity to compete in a changing health care environment. Over time, the distribution of
hospitals by ownership type has fluctuated with the number of public hospitals and the
proportion they represent among community hospitals in the country consistently declining
while the number of for-profit hospitals has increased. In 1999, there were 1,197 public
hospitals representing 24.2% of all community hospitals.83 By 2016, there were 956 public
hospitals representing nearly 20% of all community hospitals in the United States (community
hospitals are all nonfederal, short-term general, and specialty hospitals whose facilities and
services are available to the public).83 As hospitals consider alternatives to ownership and
governance, this research may have some relevance for how they adapt to health reform.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1-1. Theoretical framework: C-M-O pathway through which hospital ownership and payment adjustment
are associated with mortality

Table 1-1. Data sources
Data source
American Hospital Association Annual Survey database,
2013-2017

CMS Hospital Compare Complications and Deaths – Hospital,
2016-2018 (CMS-C&D)

American Community Survey 5-year estimates, 2013-2017
(ACS)

KHN files listing hospital-level penalty data under CMS Acute
Inpatient Prospective Payment System Final Rule, 2013-2017
Kaiser Family Foundation

Variables
Name of hospital
County where hospital is located
State where hospital is located
Hospital ownership
Teaching hospital status
30 day mortality score for AMI
30 day mortality score for CABG
30 day mortality score for COPD
30 day mortality score for heart failure
30 day mortality score for pneumonia
Median household income (county)
% with private health insurance coverage (county)
% with public health insurance coverage (county)
% below poverty level
Penalty under HRRP
Located in a Medicaid expansion state

Table 1-2 HRRP payment adjustment periods corresponding to 30-day RSMR measurement periods
30-day
mortality
measurement
period
2018 mortality
measure

Quarters

Max
payment
adjustment

Last 3 months (Jul-Sep 2014) of FY2014 HRRP (year 2) payment adjustment

1

2

All (Oct 2014-Sep 2015) of FY2015 HRRP (year 3) payment adjustment

4

3

HRRP payment adjustment periods
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30-day
mortality
measurement
period
calculated over
the period Jul
2014 - Jun 2017

Quarters

Max
payment
adjustment

4

3

3

3

HRRP payment adjustment periods
All (Oct 2015-Sep 2016) of FY2016 HRRP (year 4) payment adjustment
First 9 months (Oct 2016-Jun 2017) of FY2017 HRRP (year 5) payment adjustment

2017 mortality
measure
calculated over
the period Jul
2013 - Jun 2016

Last 3 months (Jul-Sep 2013) of FY2013 HRRP (year 1) payment adjustment

1

1

All (Oct 2013-Sep 2014) of FY2014 HRRP (year 2) payment adjustment

4

2

All (Oct 2014-Sep 2015) of FY2015 HRRP (year 3) payment adjustment

4

3

First 9 months (Oct 2015-Jun 2016) of FY2016 HRRP (year 4) payment adjustment

3

3

2016 mortality
measure
calculated over
the period Jul
2012 - Jun 2015

Last 3 months (Jul-Sep 2012) of FY2012 (year minus 1 of HRRP payment adjustment)

1

NA

All (Oct 2012-Sep 2013) of FY2013 HRRP (year 1) payment adjustment

4

1

All (Oct 2013-Sep 2014) of FY2014 HRRP (year 2) payment adjustment

4

2

First 9 months (Oct 2014-Jun 2015) of FY2015 HRRP (year 3) payment adjustment

3

3

Figure 1-2 Hospitals included in analyses
All hospitals in the payment adjustment files, 2013-2017
3251

Hospitals matched to AHA surveys
2041

Ownership unchanged
Public: 306

Private, non-profit: 1081

For-profit: 540

Hospitals included in analysis (unduplicated)
1927

Figure 1-3 Operationalization of variables for analyses

Dependent

30-day RSMR
measurement period

2018 RSMR calculated
over the period Jul
2014 - Jun 2017

Main predictor

Effect
measure
modifier

HRRP payment
adjustment periods
Average penalty
from last 3 months
of FY2014 (Jul-Sep
2014) through first
9 months of

Hospital
ownership
type
No change
in
ownership
type from
2013-17

Other covariates
Teaching
hospital
status

Teaching
status in
2016

Medicaid
expansion
state
Medicaid
expansion
duration
during the
2018 RSMR

County-level
characteristics
• Median
household
income
divided by
1,000.
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FY2017 (Oct 2016Jun 2017)

measurement •
period
•

Average penalty
from last 3 months
2017 RSMR calculated of FY2013 (Jul-Sep
over the period Jul 2013 2013) through first
- Jun 2016
9 months of
FY2016 (Oct 2015Jun 2016)
Average penalty
from last 3 months
2016 RSMR calculated of FY2012 (Jul-Sep
over the period Jul 2012 2012) through first
- Jun 2015
9 months of
FY2015 (Oct 2014Jun 2015)

•
Medicaid
expansion
duration
during the
2017 RSMR
measurement
period
Medicaid
expansion
duration
during the
2016 RSMR
measurement
period

Teaching
status in
2015

Teaching
status in
2014

% private
insurance
% public
insurance
% below
poverty level
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2 Sample characteristics among hospitals participating in the Hospital
Readmissions Reduction Program and the relationship between
penalization and performance against the national 30-day risk
standardized mortality rate
2.1 Abstract
Background: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) requires Medicare to
reduce payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates. While the implementation
of the program has been accompanied by reductions in readmission rates, some have
expressed concerns about unintended consequences, including harm to patient care and even
death. This study examines whether odds of exceeding the national 30-day risk standardized
mortality rates (RSMR) for selected conditions differ depending upon whether or not hospitals
are penalized or by ownership type, controlling for hospital- and community-level
characteristics.
Methods: This study merged data from CMS Hospital Compare Complications and Deaths –
Hospital (2016-2018) publicly-available datasets with data from the American Hospital
Association (AHA) Annual Survey proprietary datasets (2013-2017) as well as from Kaiser Health
News (KHN) which formats payment adjustment factor data from the CMS Acute Inpatient
Prospective Payment System Final Rule (2013-2017) in publicly-available .csv files. This was
supplemented with data from American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates 2013-2017.
Multiple logistic regression analyses were used to estimate the odds that a hospital incurring a
penalty performs worse than the national 30-day RSMR for each condition separately for each
year.
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Results: From 2013 to 2017 (the period corresponding to the outcome measures for 2016 to
2018), 3,251 hospitals participated in the HRRP. Since data for hospital ownership are drawn
from the AHA Annual Survey, analyses include only those hospitals participating in the HRRP
that could be matched to the AHA data sets and only hospitals’ whose ownership type did not
change from 2013 to 2017 (n=1,927). Most (56.10%) were private, non-profit hospitals (the
reference category). By 2018, over 90% of public and private hospitals and nearly 90% of forprofit hospitals were classified as penalized. With a few exceptions, the penalization was
associated with a decrease in the odds of exceeding the RSMR but, the relationship between
penalization and a decrease in the odds of exceeding the RSMR was significant only for chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) in 2016, 2017, and 2018 and heart failure in 2016 and
2017. Hospital ownership was associated with significant increases in the odds of exceeding
national 30-day RSMR. When compared to private, non-profit hospitals, the odds that a
publicly owned hospital exceeded the RSMR were significant for acute myocardial infarction in
2016 and 2017, heart failure in 2017 and 2018, and pneumonia in 2018. For-profit hospital
ownership was associated with increases in the odds of exceeding the national mortality rate
for coronary artery bypass graft in 2017 and pneumonia in 2018.
Conclusions: Results found penalization was significantly associated with a decrease in the
odds of exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for COPD and heart failure. Results were also
consistent with other studies finding that the association between public hospital ownership is
associated with poorer performance on quality-of-care metrics.
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2.2 Introduction
The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), launched in 2013, is an aspect of
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. HRRP requires Medicare to reduce
payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates (i.e. rates of unplanned
readmissions 30 days after initial hospitalization) for patients in Medicare.1–8 The conditions
initially included in the program were acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure (the
leading cause of readmissions among Medicare beneficiaries),9 and pneumonia.2 In 2015, the
list of conditions expanded to include patients with acute exacerbation of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD) and elective surgery for hip and knee replacement.2 In 2017, the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) added the procedure coronary artery bypass
graft (CABG) to the list.10 Conditions are identified based on primary discharge diagnosis and
hospitals must have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis to be measured.2,5
While the implementation of the program has been accompanied by reductions in
readmission rates,11 some have expressed concerns about unintended consequences, including
harm to patient care and even death.4,6,8,9,12–14 Introducing incentives to reduce readmissions
may motivate health care providers to use inappropriate care strategies, such as discouraging
triage for emergency care or delaying readmissions.9 However, the evidence for mortality
associated with HRRP is mixed. Some investigators found that reductions in hospital
readmission rates were correlated with reductions in mortality rates, others found that
implementation of the HRRP was associated with a subsequent decrease readmissions and an
increase in mortality, and still others found that decreases in readmissions had no significant
impact on mortality.7,9,13–15 Inconsistencies in these findings also extended to the disease
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conditions which focused on the conditions initially included in the program: AMI, heart failure,
and pneumonia. One study found that the introduction of HRRP had no effect on mortality
following admission for AMI and heart failure but was significantly correlated with an increase
in mortality following pneumonia admission.8 Another study found that HRRP implementation
was significantly associated with an increase in 30-day mortality following hospitalization for
pneumonia as well as heart failure but not for AMI.14 A third study found that reductions in
readmissions were significantly correlated with reductions in 30-day mortality rates after
admission for all three of the same conditions.13 Two studies examining only heart failure both
showed HRRP associated with reductions in readmissions but only one demonstrated a
significant association with mortality following hospitalization, showing increases in mortality at
30 days and one year.9,15
Under HRRP, hospitals serving a high proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients, like public hospitals, have been more likely to receive financial penalties, potentially
impeding their ability to invest resources in improving patient outcomes.14,16 If these hospitals
find that their ability to provide care is hindered as a result of financial penalties, the potential
for harm exists even when there is little or no change in readmissions.7 Public hospitals may
find it particularly challenging to address causes of readmissions. Penalties for readmissions
may further strain their limited resources, inhibiting their ability to invest in effective transitions
of care programs or other efforts to improve care quality and patient outcomes.4,12,14
This study examines performance on 30-day RSMR for AMI, heart failure, COPD, CABG
and pneumonia (referred to, collectively, as conditions) as an outcome associated with two
factors: 1) penalization under HRRP and 2) ownership. Specifically, I examine whether odds of
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exceeding the national 30-day risk standardized mortality rates (RSMR) for AMI, heart failure,
COPD, CABG and pneumonia differ depending upon whether or not hospitals are penalized or
by ownership type, controlling for hospital- and community-level characteristics. There is
previous research on the relationship between hospital ownership and quality of care as well as
between hospital ownership and patient outcomes.5,17–23 There is also research on the
relationship between HRRP implementation and mortality.7–9,12–15 This project, however, is
distinguished by its focus on the relationship between penalties assessed under HRRP and
performance against national 30-day RSMR. Hospitals’ performance compared to the national
30-day RSMR for each condition are made publicly available.24 Understanding how hospitals
vary may offer insight about the consequences of pay-for-performance programs for hospitals
and their ability to compete in a health care marketplace where publicly-available information
may guide patients’ decisions about obtaining care.

2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Data sources
Hospital-level data representing the outcome (30-day RSMR for AMI, heart failure,
pneumonia, COPD, and CABG) are drawn from CMS Hospital Compare Complications and
Deaths – Hospital (2016-2018) publicly-available datasets.25–27 CMS’s risk standardized
mortality measure is based on data from index admissions over a three-year period28–30 and
expressed as a percent and calculated as the ratio of the number of "predicted" deaths to the
number of "expected" deaths at a given hospital within 30 days of index admission, multiplied
by the national observed mortality rate. A lower RSMR indicates lower-than-expected mortality
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rates while a higher RSMR indicates higher-than-expected mortality rates.31,32,33 Each hospitals’
penalty under HRRP for each year during the period are obtained from Kaiser Health News
(KHN) which formats payment adjustment factor (PAF) data from the CMS Acute Inpatient
Prospective Payment System Final Rule (2013-2017) in convenient, publicly-available .csv files
operationalized as the percentage by which payments to base operating DRG reimbursements
are reduced.11,34
Data representing hospital ownership and teaching hospital status are drawn from the
American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey proprietary datasets (2013-2017).35–39
Other studies of the relationship between hospital characteristics and performance under HRRP
have examined the influence of teaching hospital status and local socioeconomic characteristics
finding that the majority of hospitals penalized tended to be teaching hospitals and hospitals
serving those with lower socioeconomic status.1,2,18,40 For this reason, selected covariates were
related to these factors. Data for characteristics of the county in which the hospital is located
(median household income, private health insurance coverage, public health insurance
coverage, percent of county residents below the poverty level) are drawn from American
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates 2013-2017.41
2.3.2 Study population
From 2013 to 2017, 3,251 hospitals participated in the HRRP. Since data for hospital
ownership are drawn from the AHA Annual Survey, analyses include only those hospitals
participating in the HRRP that could be matched to the AHA data sets (n=2,041) and only
hospitals’ whose ownership type did not change from 2013 to 2017 which is the period
corresponding to the outcome measures for 2016 to 2018 (n=1,927; Figure X).
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2.3.3 Measures
Performance against the national 30-day RSMR (the outcome measure) was
operationalized as a binary variable representing whether a hospital exceeded the rate for a
given condition (the national rates varied by condition). For hospitals whose performance
exceeded the national 30-day RSMR, this variable was coded as “yes”. For AMI, the national
RSMR was 14.0 in 2016, 13.5 in 2017, and 13.1 in 2018. For COPD, the national RSMR was 8.0
in both 2016 and 2017 and 8.3 in 2018. For CABG, the national RSMR was 3.2 in 2016, 3.1, in
2017, and 3.0 in 2018. For heart failure, the national RSMR was 12.1 in 2016, 11.9 in 2017, and
11.7 in 2018. For pneumonia, the national RSMR was 16.3 in 2016, 15.9 in 2017, and 15.7 in
2018.42
The primary predictor was a binary variable representing whether a hospital was
penalized during the 30-day RSMR measurement period. Since payment adjustments under
HRRP are applied annually, operationalizing the variable for penalty required computing the
average of the payment adjustments applied during the three-year outcome measurement
period. As the RSMR measurement period corresponds to 12 quarters of payment
adjustments, I computed the average penalty over 12 quarters. During the 2016 RSMR
measurement period, maximum penalties varied from 0% (for the first three months of the
period before payment adjustments were applied) to 3% during the final nine months of the
measurement period. By the 2018 RSMR measurement period, maximum penalties varied from
2% (for the first three months of the period before payment adjustments were applied) to 3%
during the remainder of the measurement period. For hospitals whose average penalty was
greater than zero, this variable was coded as “yes” (reference value = no).
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Other covariates represented hospital ownership, whether the hospital’s home state
expanded Medicaid eligibility, teaching hospital status, county-level median income, and
county-level rates of private health insurance coverage, public health insurance coverage, and
poverty. To construct the variable for hospital ownership, I recoded hospitals whose control
codes were classified as “Government, Nonfederal” (state, county, city, city-county, or hospital
district or authority) as public. Those whose control codes were classified as “Nongovernment,
not-for-profit” (church-operated, other not-for-profit) were recoded as private, non-profit (the
reference group). Those whose control codes were classified as “Investor-owned (for-profit)”
(individual, partnership, corporation) were recoded as for-profit. Since the number of states
adopting Medicaid expansion increased during the period corresponding to the outcome
measures, the variable representing the duration of Medicaid expansion in each hospital’s
home state is a score ranging from 0 (expanded Medicaid was not in place at all during the
outcome measurement period) to 1 (Medicaid expansion was in place during the entire
outcome measurement period). AHA considers hospitals that are members of the Council of
Teaching Hospitals (COTH) of the Association of American Medical Colleges as major teaching
hospitals. Since teaching hospital status may also vary during the period corresponding to the
outcome measures, hospitals were assigned the teaching hospital status in place at the midpoint of the mortality measurement period. For hospitals classified as major teaching hospitals,
this variable was coded as “yes” (reference value = no). Median income was divided by 1000 so
that the coefficient may be interpreted as change in odds for each $1,000 increase. The
proportion of those with private health insurance coverage is the proportion of those in the
county with employer-based coverage, directly purchased coverage, or Tricare/military
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coverage alone or in combination.43 The proportion of those with public health insurance
coverage is the proportion of those in the county with Medicaid/means-tested public coverage
alone or in combination.44 The proportion of those below the poverty level is the proportion of
those in the county living below the poverty level for the past 12 months.45 Median income
represents household median income.46
2.3.4 Analysis plan
First, I compared the characteristics of hospitals included in the analysis to those
excluded because they either did not match to AHA or because their ownership status changed
over the periods of interest and tested whether differences were significant. I then used
descriptive statistics to summarize the characteristics of hospitals included in the analysis,
computing frequency distributions of hospital-level characteristics by ownership type. I also
computed, by ownership type, the prevalence of penalization and the distribution of hospitals
exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for each condition. These computations were followed by
multiple logistic regression to test the association between penalization and exceeding the
national 30-day RSMR for each condition adjusted by ownership type, teaching hospital status,
Medicaid expansion status, county-level rates of public health insurance coverage, private
health insurance coverage, poverty, and county-level median income. For all analyses, I used R
version 3.6.1 with tidyverse (version 1.3.0) and dplyr (version 1.0.2) packages.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Comparison of hospitals included in the analysis to those excluded
Of the 3,251 hospitals that participated in the HRRP from 2013 to 2017, 1,927 met the
criteria for inclusion (i.e. matched to AHA survey data and maintained consistent ownership).
Table 2.1 compares those that were included to those that were excluded. The proportion of
hospitals included in the analysis that were located in a Medicaid expansion state did not differ
significantly from the proportion of those that were excluded. There was also no significant
difference in the average rate of public health insurance coverage in the counties where
hospitals were located. However, those hospitals that were included did differ significantly
from those that were excluded on a number of other predictors. Hospitals that were included
were located in counties that had an average rate of private insurance coverage that was
slightly lower than that of hospitals that were excluded. Hospitals that were included were also
located in counties that had an average poverty rate that was slightly higher and median
income slightly lower than that of hospitals that were excluded. The proportion of hospitals
that were penalized by either the average or annual measure was significantly higher among
those included in the analysis than among those who were excluded for all years except 2013.
When examining the outcome measures of performance against the national 30-day RSMR,
hospitals that were included did not differ significantly from those that were excluded in the
proportion of those exceeding the national rates, with the exception of pneumonia. For each
year, a higher proportion of those that were included in the analysis exceeded the 30-day RSMR
for pneumonia than those that were excluded (2016: 48.91% vs. 44.55%; 2017: 49.23% vs.
43.88%; 2018: 52.81% vs. 46.96%).
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2.4.2 Summary of hospital characteristics, penalties, and 30-day mortality, by ownership type
Among the 1,927 hospitals included in the analysis, most (n=1,081) were private, nonprofit hospitals (56.10%; Table 2.2). For-profit institutions represented 28.02% (n=540) of
hospitals in the analysis followed by public hospitals (n=306; 15.88%). Across all types, their
status as major teaching hospitals changed little across to outcome measurement period. From
year to year, from two to three for-profit hospitals, 82 to 100 private hospitals, and 12 to 15
public hospitals had major teaching hospital status. The highest proportion of major teaching
hospitals were found among private hospitals (8.66%-9.97%).
Beginning in 2014, the ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility, providing states with full
federal funding for expansion during the first three years and covering at least 90% of
expansion thereafter.47 Subsequently, the number of states opting to expand coverage
increased each year. The proportion of hospitals located in a Medicaid expansion state
increased over time across all hospital types. As the years progressed, the proportion of private
hospitals located in expansion states ranged from 57.35% to 68.46%. The proportion of public
hospitals located in expansion states was comparable to the proportion of for-profit hospitals
(27.12% to 37.91% vs. 27.04% to 37.59%).
The counties where public hospitals were located had, on average, the highest rates of
public health insurance coverage and the lowest rates of private health insurance coverage. In
the counties where public hospitals were located, an average of 21.64% of residents were
covered, alone or in combination, by Medicaid or some other means-tested public health
insurance while 62.35% held private health insurance coverage. In counties where for-profit
hospitals and private hospitals were located, the average proportion of those with public health
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insurance coverage was 20.24% and 20.02%, respectively. In counties where private hospitals
were located, 67.79%, on average, had private health insurance coverage while 63.53% of
residents had private health insurance coverage in counties that were home to for-profit
hospitals.
The counties where public hospitals were located also had, on average, the highest rates
of poverty and lowest median incomes. In those counties, 17.87% of residents on average lived
below the poverty rate and the median income averaged $50,375.96. Counties home to private
and for-profit hospitals had somewhat lower rates of poverty (14.78% and 16.41%,
respectively) and somewhat higher median incomes ($58,398.58 and $53,730.59, respectively).
Under HRRP, the payment adjustment was implemented in phases. In fiscal year (FY)
2013 (October-September), 1% against a hospital’s Medicare reimbursement was the maximum
penalty assessed. In FY2014, that increased to 2% and reached the current maximum of 3% in
FY2015.1 Since CMS assesses hospital penalties based on a curve, a certain percentage of
hospitals will always face penalties, regardless of improvements in readmission rates.48 Table
2.3 shows the percentage of hospitals in each ownership category penalized by year. From
2013 to 2017, well over half of hospitals in each ownership category were assessed a penalty
each year with the proportion of penalized hospitals increasing by at least a dozen points from
the beginning of the period to the end. Similarly, when the average penalty was computed, the
proportion of penalized hospitals increased during each subsequent measurement period. By
2018, over 90% of public and private hospitals and nearly 90% of for-profit hospitals were
classified as penalized according to the average measure.
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The proportion of public hospitals exceeding the national 30-day RSMR was routinely
higher than that of private or for-profit hospitals over all conditions for all three years. This was
especially pronounced for heart failure where over half of public hospitals exceeded the
national RSMR compared to less than half of private or for-profit hospitals. Since hospitals
must have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis to be measured, the number of
hospitals eligible for inclusion varied by measure. There were the fewest observations for
CABG. No more than 15% of public hospitals, 36% of private hospitals, and 28% of for-profit
hospitals had observations for CABG. For all other conditions, the number of observations
exceeded 50% of the hospitals in each ownership category.
2.4.3 Multiple logistic regression analyses
Penalization
Penalization, the main predictor, was generally associated with reduced odds of
exceeding the national 30-day RSMR when controlling for other variables but the relationship
was significant for only two conditions: COPD and heart failure. In 2016 and 2017, hospitals
classified as penalized under the average measure were less likely to exceed the national RSMR
for COPD and heart failure. For COPD (Table 2.7), the odds of exceeding the national RSMR
were 0.55 in 2016 (CI: 0.36, 0.85, p<0.01) and 0.36 in 2017 (CI: 0.19, 0.65, p<0.01). For heart
failure (Table 2.8), the odds of exceeding the national mortality rate were 0.63 in 2016 (CI:
0.40, 0.97, p<0.05) and 0.45 in 2017 (CI: 0.25, 0.79, p<0.01). In 2018, hospitals classified as
penalized under the average measure were less likely to exceed the national mortality rate only
for COPD (OR: 0.34; CI: 0.15, 0.69, p<0.01).
Ownership
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Compared to private hospitals and controlling for other variables, public hospitals
classified as penalized under the average measure were significantly more likely to exceed the
national 30-day RSMR for three of the five conditions: AMI (2016 and 2017), heart failure (2017
and 2018), and pneumonia (2018). For AMI (Table 2.5), the odds of a public hospital exceeding
the national RSMR were similar for 2016 (OR: 1.61, CI: 1.09, 2.38, p<0.05) and 2017 (OR: 1.66,
CI: 1.10, 2.51, p<0.05). In the case of heart failure (Table 2.8), the odds of a public hospital
exceeding the national RSMR was 1.47 in 2017 (CI=1.05, 2.05, p<0.05) and 1.60 in 2018
(CI=1.14, 2.25, p<0.01). The odds of a public hospital exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for
pneumonia (Table 2.9) was 1.41 in 2018 (CI=1.02, 1.94, p<0.05). For-profit hospitals classified
as penalized under the weighted measure were significantly more likely than private hospitals
to exceed the national RSMR for CABG (Table 2.6) in 2017 (OR: 1.69, CI=1.03, 2.80, p<0.05) and
pneumonia in 2018 (OR: 1.38, CI=1.05, 1.81, p<0.05).
Teaching hospital
Teaching hospital status was the factor most often associated significantly with the
national 30-day RSMR when controlling for other variables. Those classified as teaching
hospitals were less like to exceed the national RSMR for all conditions across all years except for
COPD (Table 2.7) where the associations were significant for 2017 and 2018 only. However,
relatively few hospitals in the analyses were classified as teaching hospitals.
Medicaid expansion
Generally, the duration of Medicaid expansion in the state where a hospital was located
was inversely related to the odds of exceeding the national 30-day RSMR but that relationship

42

was significant only for pneumonia (Table 2.9) in 2016 (OR: 0.48, CI=0.25, 0.93, p<0.05) when
controlling for other variables.
Private health insurance coverage
The county-level rate of private health insurance coverage was significantly associated
with slightly higher odds of exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for several disease conditions
over several years. For heart failure (Table 2.8) and pneumonia (Table 2.9), this was true across
most years. The odds ranged from 1.05 to 1.08 for heart failure (2016 – OR: 1.07, CI=1.04,
1.10, p<0.001; 2017 – OR: 1.05, CI=1.02, 1.07, p<0.01; 2018 – OR: 1.08, CI=1.05, 1.11,
p<0.001). For pneumonia, the odds were 1.04 for both 2016 (CI=1.01, 1.07, p<0.01) and 2017
(CI=1.02, 1.07, p<0.01). For CABG (Table 2.6), this was true only for one year. In 2016, the odds
of exceeding the 30-day RSMR for CABG increased with the rate of private health insurance
coverage (OR: 1.05, CI=1.01, 1.11, p<0.05).
Public health insurance coverage
There was almost no change in national 30-day RSMR by county-level rate of public
health insurance coverage. The association was significant only for AMI (Table 2.5) in 2016
where the rate of coverage was associated with slightly lower odds of exceeding the RSMR (OR:
0.90, CI=0.90, 0.99, p<0.05).
Poverty level
The poverty rate in the county where the hospital is located was significantly associated
with the national 30-day RSMR only for pneumonia (Table 2.9). For pneumonia, the
relationship was significant for 2016 and 2018. In both years, the county-level poverty rate was
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associated with slightly lower odds of exceeding the RSMR: 0.95 (2016: CI=0.92, 0.99, p<0.05;
2018: CI=0.91, 0.98, p<0.01).
Median income
Median income was significantly associated with odds of exceeding the national 30-day
RSMR for all conditions/procedures across all years. Each $1,000 increase in county-level
median income was associated with slightly reduced odds of exceeding the national rate.

2.5 Discussion
This study examined whether odds of exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for AMI,
heart failure, COPD, CABG and pneumonia differed depending upon: 1) whether or not a
hospital is penalized and 2) hospital ownership type. With the exceptions of AMI and CABG in
2016 and 2018 and pneumonia in 2018, the results for penalization pointed to a decrease in the
odds of exceeding the rate. However, the relationship between penalization and a decrease in
the odds of exceeding the RSMR was significant only for COPD (2016, 2017, and 2018) and
heart failure (2016 and 2017).
Hospital ownership, on the other hand, was more often associated with significant
increases in the odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR. When compared to private, nonprofit hospitals, the odds that a publicly owned hospital exceeded the RSMR were significant
for AMI (2016 and 2017), heart failure (2017 and 2018), and pneumonia (2018). For-profit
hospital ownership was associated with increases in the odds of exceeding the national
mortality rate for CABG in 2017 and pneumonia in 2018. That public hospital ownership was so
frequently associated with the odds of exceeding the national 30-day mortality rate is
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consistent with other studies of the association between hospital ownership and measures of
care quality. Safety net hospitals, which include public hospitals, often show poor performance
on a number of the standard quality measures.49 Improving quality may require investing
resources which public hospitals, as safety-net institutions, lack.50 Safety net hospitals tend to
have smaller gains in quality performance and be less likely to be high-performing over time
compared to non–safety net institutions.50
That penalization was more often associated with a decrease in the odds of exceeding
the national 30-day RSMR provides some support for the premise underlying HRRP that
incentives to reduce readmissions may motivate institutions to improve overall care quality.14
The relationship, though, was significant only for COPD for all three years and for heart failure
for two out of three years. This may point to the influence of initiatives to improve quality of
care for both conditions. In 2001, for example, the Global Initiative for Chronic Obstructive
Lung Disease (GOLD) program produced its first report with recommendations for the COPD
management. Revisions were issued in 2006 and 2011 with subsequent updates in 2013, 2014,
2015, and 2016.51 Other studies have described trials of disease management programs for
COPD, care bundles involving interdisciplinary teams, and pulmonary rehabilitation with varying
results.52 In the case of heart failure, in 2005, the American Heart Association launched Get
With The Guidelines® -- Heart Failure (GWTG), a voluntary hospital-based national voluntary
quality improvement program.53 Research from the program found that it was generally
associated with reduced readmission rates but findings associated with mortality were
inconsistent.3,16 While heart failure was among the three conditions targeted by HRRP from the
outset, COPD was introduced in 2015 which was roughly in the middle of the 2017 RSMR
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measurement period. The addition of this condition to the program may have brought focused
attention to COPD care management strategies. When combined with past efforts to promote
quality, the introduction of COPD to HRRP may have had both cumulative and synergistic
effects.
Limitations
This study used a cross-sectional design where the association between the exposure
and the outcome is examined at a single point in time.54 As a result, while the average penalty
represented the mean of the penalties assessed over the 36 months coinciding with the
outcome measurement period, under this design it is not possible to ascertain that the
exposure preceded the outcome in a way that could suggest causality.55–58 Also potentially
problematic was the introduction of COPD into the HRRP in 2015. The introduction of COPD
into HRRP applied to all hospitals participating in the program. During the 2016 RSMR
measurement period, COPD was part of the HRRP readmission measure for nine of 36 months
(25% of the measurement period). This increased to 21 months (58.33%) during the 2017
RSMR measurement period and to 33 months (91.67%) during the 2018 RSMR measurement
period. This means that it may not be possible to make meaningful comparisons of results from
year to year.
The data available for analysis introduced additional limitations. The study relies on
secondary data which were not gathered with this analysis in mind. The outcome measure, a
binary variable representing whether a hospital exceeded the rate for a given condition, may
not be sufficiently sensitive to improvements in care quality that may have been associated
with HRRP penalties. Confounding may also have been a potential source of bias. While the
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models include an array of covariates, it is possible that they are underspecified. If the
unmeasured variables are associated with mortality, then failure to control for them may
overestimate any observed association. Other investigators have included patient-level
covariates in their analyses, but findings are not consistent across such studies. Papadogeorgou
et al. included indicators for patient-level comorbidities. They focused on AMI, heart failure,
and pneumonia and found that the introduction of HRRP was not significantly associated with
mortality following admission for AMI and heart failure but was significantly associated with an
increase in mortality following pneumonia admission. Focusing on the same conditions, Gupta
et al. found that HRRP implementation was significantly associated with an increase in 30-day
mortality following hospitalization for pneumonia as well as heart failure but not for AMI.9 This
study does not include patient-level characteristics. Instead, it relies on county-level
characteristics and includes a variable representing the duration of Medicaid expansion in the
state where the hospital is located, an important indicator of the resources available to
hospitals that may offset penalties.
Hospital ownership may also be endogenous to the characteristics of the area in which a
hospital is located.5,21,23,59,60 If hospitals preferentially locate in certain areas and these areas
also have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. Similarly, if hospitals preferentially serve certain types of patients and these
patients have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. To address this, the logistic regression models include covariates representing
area county-level characteristics but it is possible that these may not sufficiently manage
endogeneity.
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2.6 Conclusion
This study examined whether odds of exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for AMI,
heart failure, COPD, CABG and pneumonia differed depending upon: 1) whether or not
hospitals are penalized and 2) ownership type, controlling for hospital- and community-level
characteristics. This study was distinguished from others examining the relationship between
hospital ownership and quality of care, hospital ownership and patient outcomes, and HRRP
implementation and mortality by its focus on the relationship between penalties assessed
under HRRP and performance against national 30-day RSMR. Results found penalization was
significantly associated with a decrease in the odds of exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for
COPD and heart failure. Results were also consistent with other studies finding that the
association between public hospital ownership is associated with poorer performance on
quality-of-care metrics.

2.7 Tables and Figures

Figure 2-1 Hospitals included in analyses
All hospitals in the payment adjustment files, 2013-2017
3251

Hospitals matched to AHA surveys
2041

Ownership unchanged
Public: 306

Private, non-profit: 1081

For-profit: 540

Hospitals included in analysis (unduplicated)
1927
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Table 2-1 Comparison of hospital included in the analyses to those excluded
Characteristic

Included (n=1927)

Excluded (n=1324)

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

Test statistic
!

df

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

1678

65.68

9.43

953

66.90

9.41

3.19*

1981.3

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

1677

20.35

6.75

959

19.98

6.60

-1.35

2031.9

% below poverty level
(county)

1689

15.75

5.64

960

15.24

5.69

-2.24*

1980.9

Median income (county)

1669

55751.41

15824.62

953

57678.73

15529.45

3.04*

2011.9

%

Frequency

Frequency

%
"!

Medicaid expansion
2014

849

44.06

628

47.43

3.47

2015

996

51.69

725

54.76

2.85

2016

1059

54.96

767

57.93

2.70

2013

1272

67.23

822

64.27

2.85

2014

1300

68.49

826

64.08

6.53*

2015

1558

81.44

982

75.48

16.25***

2016

1568

81.50

996

75.91

14.44***

2017

1581

82.09

1017

76.81

13.29***

2016

1669

88.31

1059

82.86

18.44***

2017

1723

91.16

1102

86.36

17.77***

2018

1752

92.41

1125

87.41

21.42***

2016

661

48.21

436

48.39

0.00

2017

651

48.58

408

46.10

1.22

2018

642

48.75

429

48.92

0.00

2016

277

47.51

187

43.49

1.46

2017

291

50.09

199

47.16

0.73

2018

289

50.97

205

48.93

0.33

Penalized (annual)

Penalized (average)

Exceeded national 30 day
RSMR
AMI

CABG
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COPD
2016

791

45.96

508

46.95

0.22

2017

805

47.35

505

46.85

0.05

2018

805

47.58

526

48.98

0.46

2016

805

46.34

486

44.63

0.73

2017

780

45.30

484

44.73

0.06

2018

816

47.97

481

44.58

2.92

2016

871

48.91

503

44.55

5.08*

2017

868

49.23

491

43.88

7.67**

2018

922

52.81

525

46.96

9.09**

Heart failure

Pneumonia

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2-2 Characteristics of hospitals (2013-2017) and counties
Characteristic

Hospital ownership type
Private, non-profit

Public
n=306

For-profit

n=1,081

n=540

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Teaching
hospital
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

15
14
13
13
12

5.30
4.76
4.55
4.59
4.49

100
96
100
82
85

9.94
9.43
9.97
8.66
9.38

3
2
2
3
2

0.67
0.44
0.39
0.61
0.43

Medicaid
expansion state
2014
2015
2016
2017

83
97
116
116

27.12
31.70
37.91
37.91

620
724
740
740

57.35
66.98
68.46
68.46

146
175
203
203

27.04
32.41
37.59
37.59

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

273

62.35

9.79

922

67.79

8.79

483

63.53

9.40

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

274

21.64

7.38

922

20.02

6.56

481

20.24

6.68

% below poverty
level (county)

275

17.87

6.73

930

14.78

5.21

484

16.41

5.36

Median income
(county)

272

50,375.96

15,691.74

918

58,398.58

16,351.25

479

53,730.59

13,687.23
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Table 2-3 Percent of hospitals penalized by type of ownership, 2013-2017
Period

Hospital ownership type
Private, non-profit
n=1,081

Public
n=306
Year

For-profit
n=540

% penalized (annually)

2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

66.33
68.33
79.54
80.72
80.72

67.01
68.48
82.64
82.59
83.44

30-day RSMR measurement
period
2016
2017
2018

68.18
68.62
80.11
79.74
80.15

% penalized (average)
88.67
93.00
93.33

89.29
92.29
93.73

86.12
87.83
89.20

Table 2-4 Hospitals exceeding national 30-day RSMR by condition and ownership type, 2016-2018
Characteristic

Hospital ownership type
Private, non-profit

Public
n=306

2016
2017
2018

2016
2017
2018

2016
2017
2018

2016
2017
2018

For-profit

n=1,081
AMI

n

%

n

%

166
156
153

55.42
58.97
56.21

865
853
839

44.97
45.02
44.93

n

%

n

%

47
47
47

57.45
59.57
61.70

386
383
379

43.78
43.60
46.44

n

%

n

%

268
261
259

49.63
49.81
49.81

1021
1013
1012

n

%

267
262
260

53.93
54.96
56.54

n=540
n

%

340
331
325

52.94
52.87
55.08

n

%

150
151
141

54.00
63.58
59.57

n

%

45.64
47.19
48.02

432
426
421

44.44
46.24
45.13

n

Heart failure
%

n

%

1031
1028
1014

45.68
44.84
48.13

439
432
427

43.28
40.51
42.39

CABG

COPD
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2016
2017
2018

n

%

n

Pneumonia
%

n

%

289
285
281

52.94
54.04
60.14

1045
1038
1030

48.04
46.53
48.74

447
440
435

48.32
52.50
57.70

Table 2-5 Odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR for AMI, by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

1.30

0.81, 2.11

0.95

0.51, 1.77

1.70

0.78, 3.92

Public

1.61*

1.09, 2.38

1.66*

1.10, 2.51

1.42

0.94, 2.17

For-Profit

1.23

0.91, 1.68

1.00

0.74, 1.36

1.09

0.80, 1.49

0.56*

0.34, 0.88

0.41***

0.25, 0.66

0.55*

0.33, 0.90

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

1.93

0.91, 4.13

0.94

0.59, 1.50

0.83

0.56, 1.24

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

1.00

0.97, 1.03

1.01

0.98, 1.04

0.99

0.96, 1.02

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.95*

0.90, 0.99

0.97

0.92, 1.01

0.98

0.93, 1.03

% below poverty
level (county)

1.01

0.97, 1.06

1.02

0.97, 1.06

0.98

0.93, 1.02

Median income
(county)

0.97***

0.96, 0.99

0.98**

0.97, 1.00

0.98***

0.96, 0.99

Incurred penalty
during period (ref
= no)
Yes
Ownership (ref =
Private, nonprofit)

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)
Yes

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2.6 Odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR for CABG, by year
Covariates
2016

Year
2017

2018
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OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

1.80

0.92, 3.58

0.78

0.34, 1.76

1.16

0.42, 3.24

Public

1.09

0.51, 2.35

1.53

0.72, 3.30

1.19

0.55, 2.62

For-Profit

1.26

0.76, 2.11

1.69*

1.03, 2.80

0.89

0.53, 1.51

0.38**

0.20, 0.68

0.43**

0.24, 0.75

0.28***

0.15, 0.52

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

0.77

0.23, 2.55

1.51

0.72, 3.22

1.20

0.63, 2.33

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

1.05*

1.01, 1.11

1.00

0.96, 1.05

1.01

0.96, 1.06

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.99

0.92, 1.07

0.93

0.85, 1.00

0.95

0.88, 1.04

% below poverty
level (county)

1.0

0.92, 1.08

1.03

0.95, 1.11

1.01

0.93, 1.09

Median income
(county)

0.95***

0.93, 0.97

0.96**

0.94, 0.99

0.95***

0.93, 0.98

Incurred penalty
during period (ref
= no)
Yes
Ownership (ref =
Private, nonprofit)

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)
Yes

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2-6 Odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR for COPD, by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

0.55**

0.36, 0.85

0.36**

0.19, 0.65

0.34**

0.15, 0.69

Public

1.29

0.94, 1.77

1.16

0.84, 1.60

0.96

0.69, 1.34

For-Profit

0.89

0.68, 1.16

0.87

0.66, 1.14

0.80

0.61, 1.06

0.64

0.40, 1.00

0.51**

0.32, 0.80

0.58*

0.35, 0.94

Incurred penalty
during period
(ref = no)
Yes
Ownership (ref =
Private, nonprofit)

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)
Yes
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Medicaid
expansion state
duration

0.96

0.49, 1.87

0.77

0.51, 1.17

0.88

0.62, 1.26

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

1.01

0.98, 1.03

1.02

1.00, 1.05

1.03

1.00, 1.05

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.98

0.94, 1.02

1.01

0.96, 1.05

0.99

0.95, 1.03

% below poverty
level (county)

0.97

0.93, 1.01

0.97

0.93, 1.01

0.98

0.94, 1.02

Median income
(county)

0.98***

0.97, 0.99

0.98**

0.97, 0.99

0.97***

0.96, 0.98

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2-7 Odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR for heart failure, by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

0.63*

0.40, 0.97

0.45**

0.25, 0.79

0.52

0.25, 1.01

Public

1.31

0.94, 1.81

1.47*

1.05, 2.05

1.60**

1.14, 2.25

For-Profit

0.92

0.70, 1.21

0.79

0.60, 1.04

0.79

0.59, 1.04

0.31***

0.17, 0.51

0.32***

0.19, 0.53

0.27***

0.15, 0.46

Medicaid
expansion
state duration

0.65

0.33, 1.29

0.88

0.58, 1.34

0.93

0.65, 1.33

% with private
health
insurance
coverage
(county)

1.07***

1.04, 1.10

1.05**

1.02, 1.07

1.08***

1.05, 1.11

% with public
health
insurance
coverage
(county)

1.01

0.97, 1.06

1.00

0.96, 1.05

1.01

0.97, 1.06

Incurred
penalty during
period (ref =
no)
Yes
Ownership (ref
= Private, nonprofit)

Teaching
hospital (ref =
no)
Yes
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% below
poverty level
(county)

0.97

0.93, 1.01

0.98

0.94, 1.02

1.00

0.96, 1.04

Median
income
(county)

0.96***

0.94, 0.97

0.96***

0.95, 0.97

0.96***

0.94, 0.97

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2-8 Odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR for pneumonia, by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

OR

95% CI

0.94

0.63, 1.40

0.89

0.53, 1.47

1.13

0.62, 2.06

Public

1.10

0.81, 1.51

1.20

0.88, 1.65

1.41*

1.02, 1.94

For-Profit

0.87

0.66, 1.13

1.14

0.87, 1.49

1.38*

1.05, 1.81

Incurred penalty
during period
(ref = no)
Yes
Ownership (ref =
Private, nonprofit)

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)
0.42***

0.25, 0.67

0.48**

0.30, 0.75

0.55*

0.34, 0.88

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

Yes

0.48*

0.25, 0.93

0.69

0.46, 1.04

0.86

0.60, 1.22

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

1.04**

1.01, 1.07

1.04**

1.02, 1.07

1.03

1.00, 1.05

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

1.04*

1.00, 1.08

1.03

0.99, 1.07

1.01

0.96, 1.05

% below poverty
level (county)

*0.95

0.92, 0.99

0.96

0.93, 1.00

0.95**

0.91, 0.98

Median income
(county)

0.97***

0.96, 0.98

0.97***

0.96, 0.98

0.97***

0.96, 0.98

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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3 Evaluating the association between penalization and the 30-day risk
standardized mortality rate for targeted conditions: how do effects
vary by hospital ownership?
3.1 Abstract
Background: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) requires Medicare to
reduce payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates. While the implementation
of the program has been accompanied by reductions in readmission rates, some have
expressed concerns about unintended consequences, including harm to patient care and even
death. Under HRRP, hospitals serving a high proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients, like public hospitals, have been more likely to receive financial penalties, potentially
impeding their ability to invest resources in improving patient outcomes. This study examines,
among penalized hospitals, the association between penalization under HRRP and the 30-day
risk standardized mortality rate (RSMR) for conditions of interest under HRRP, stratified by
hospital ownership and examined over time as penalties under HRRP were phased in.
Methods: This study merged data from CMS Hospital Compare Complications and Deaths –
Hospital (2016-2018) publicly-available datasets with data from the American Hospital
Association (AHA) Annual Survey proprietary datasets (2013-2017) as well as from Kaiser Health
News (KHN) which formats payment adjustment factor data from the CMS Acute Inpatient
Prospective Payment System Final Rule (2013-2017) in publicly-available .csv files. This was
supplemented with data from American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates 2013-2017.
Multiple linear regression analyses stratified by hospital ownership tested the association
between penalization and 30-day RSMR for each condition by year. Stratified multivariate
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linear regression analysis with fixed effects was to examine change in RSMR over the 2016 to
the 2018 measurement periods by condition for any given hospital.
Results: Of 1,764 penalized hospitals, most (57.20%) were private, non-profit hospitals.
Among public hospitals and private non-profit hospitals, each 1% increase in average penalty
was significantly associated with a percentage point reduction in 30-day RSMR for chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) each year and heart failure in 2016. Among for-profit
hospitals, increase in average penalty was also associated with significantly lower 30-day RSMR
for COPD for each year as well as for coronary artery bypass graft in 2016 (CABG). However, for
pneumonia, the average penalty was associated with significantly higher 30-day RSMR in both
2016 and 2017. Under the fixed effects model, the average penalty was significantly associated
only with heart failure 30-day RSMR and only among public hospitals. For a given public
hospital, each percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with 0.49
percentage point increase in 30-day RSMR for heart failure (CI=0.04, 0.95). For public hospitals,
the fixed effects model reversed the direction of the effect observed under the multiple linear
regression model for heart failure as well as for COPD.
Conclusions: When examined for each outcome measurement period and stratified by
ownership, average payment adjustments under HRRP were associated with significantly lower
30-day RSMR for COPD as well as with reductions in the average RSMR for heart failure
(although, for heart failure, not all of the associations were significant). When a fixed effects
model was applied, only the association between average penalty and heart failure RSMR
among public hospitals remained significant with the direction of the relationship reversed.
Findings may reflect a confluence of trends in care quality for selected conditions – like COPD
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and heart failure – that have been the subject of quality improvement initiatives in health care
settings. Variations among hospital ownership types suggest that hospitals may respond to the
incentives introduced by HRRP in different ways such that ownership interacts with average
penalty.
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3.2 Introduction
The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), launched in 2013, is an aspect of
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. HRRP requires Medicare to reduce
payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates (i.e. rates of unplanned
readmissions 30 days after initial hospitalization) for patients in Medicare.1–8 Under HRRP, the
payment adjustment was implemented in phases. During the first year in FY2013, the
maximum penalty assessed was 1% of a hospital’s Medicare reimbursement. In FY2014, that
increased to 2% and reached the current maximum of 3% in FY2015.1 The conditions initially
included in the program were acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure (the leading
cause of readmissions among Medicare beneficiaries),9 and pneumonia.2 In 2015, the list of
conditions expanded to include patients with acute exacerbation of chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD) and elective surgery for hip and knee replacement.2 In 2017, the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) added the procedure coronary artery bypass
graft (CABG) to the list.10 Conditions are identified based on primary discharge diagnosis and
hospitals must have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis to be measured.2,5
While the implementation of the program has been accompanied by reductions in
readmission rates,11 some have expressed concerns about unintended consequences, including
harm to patient care and even death.4,6,8,9,12–14 Introducing incentives to reduce readmissions
may motivate health care providers to use inappropriate care strategies, such as discouraging
triage for emergency care or delaying readmissions.9 However, the evidence for mortality
associated with HRRP is mixed. Some investigators found that reductions in hospital
readmission rates were correlated with reductions in mortality rates, others found that
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implementation of the HRRP was associated with a subsequent decrease in readmissions and
an increase in mortality, and still others found that decreases in readmissions had no significant
impact on mortality.7,9,13,15 Inconsistencies in previous findings also extended to the disease
conditions which focused on the conditions initially included in the program: AMI, heart failure,
and pneumonia. One study found that the introduction of HRRP had no effect on mortality
following admission for AMI and heart failure but was significantly correlated with an increase
in mortality following pneumonia admission.8 Another study found that HRRP implementation
was significantly associated with an increase in 30-day mortality following hospitalization for
pneumonia as well as heart failure but not for AMI.14 A third study found that reductions in
readmissions were significantly correlated with reductions in 30-day mortality rates after
admission for all three of the same conditions.13 Two studies examining only heart failure both
showed HRRP associated with reductions in readmissions but only one demonstrated a
significant association with mortality following hospitalization, showing increases in mortality at
30 days and one year.9,15
Under HRRP, hospitals serving a high proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients, like public hospitals, have been more likely to receive financial penalties, potentially
impeding their ability to invest resources in improving patient outcomes.14,16 If these hospitals
find that their ability to provide care is hindered as a result of financial penalties, the potential
for harm exists even when there is little or no change in readmissions.7 Public hospitals may
find it particularly challenging to address causes of readmissions. Penalties for readmissions
may further strain their limited resources, inhibiting their ability to invest in effective transitions
of care programs or other efforts to improve care quality and patient outcomes.4,12,14
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In the previous chapter, hospital ownership was found to be associated with significant
increases in the odds of exceeding national 30-day risk standardized mortality rates (RSMR).
When compared to private, non-profit hospitals, the odds that a publicly owned hospital
exceeded the mortality rate were significant for AMI (2016 and 2017), heart failure (2017 and
2018), and pneumonia (2018). For-profit hospital ownership was associated with increases in
the odds of exceeding the national mortality rate for CABG in 2017 and pneumonia in 2018.
Penalization, on the other hand, was generally associated with a decrease in the odds of
exceeding the national 30-day RSMR with the odds significant for COPD (2016, 2017, and 2018)
and heart failure (2016 and 2017). Penalization was associated with an increase in the odds of
exceeding the national RSMR only for AMI and CABG in 2016 and 2018 and pneumonia in 2018
but those results were not significant.
This study examines, among penalized hospitals, the association between penalization
under HRRP and the 30-day RSMR for conditions of interest under HRRP, stratified by hospital
ownership and examined over time as penalties under HRRP were phased in. Stratification
facilitates comparisons when estimating the strength of the association between penalties
assessed and mortality to examine if the effects vary by hospital ownership, controlling for
hospital- and community-level characteristics.
There is previous research on the relationship between hospital ownership and quality
of care as well as between hospital ownership and patient outcomes.5,17–23 There is also
research on the relationship between HRRP implementation and mortality.7–9,12–15 This project,
however, is distinguished by its focus on the relationship between penalties assessed under
HRRP and performance against national 30-day mortality rates, examined over time by hospital
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ownership type. Understanding how hospitals vary by ownership type and the change in the
relationship between penalties and mortality rates over time may offer insight about how
hospitals evolve in their response to pay-for-performance programs.

3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Data sources
Hospital-level data representing the outcome (30-day RSMR for the conditions of
interest under HRRP) are drawn from CMS Hospital Compare Complications and Deaths –
Hospital (2016-2018) publicly-available datasets.24–26 CMS’s risk standardized mortality
measure is based on data from index admissions over a three-year period and hospitals must
have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis to be measured.27–29 The RSMR is
expressed as a percent and calculated as the ratio of the number of "predicted" deaths to the
number of "expected" deaths at a given hospital within 30 days of index admission, multiplied
by the national observed mortality rate. Each hospitals’ penalty under HRRP for each year
during the period are obtained from Kaiser Health News (KHN) which formats the payment
adjustment factor (PAF) data from the CMS Acute Inpatient Prospective Payment System Final
Rule (2013-2017) in convenient, publicly available .csv files operationalized as the percentage
by which payments are reduced.
Data representing hospital ownership and teaching hospital status are drawn from the
American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey proprietary datasets (2013-2017).35–39
Other studies of the relationship between hospital characteristics and performance under HRRP
have examined the influence of teaching hospital status and local socioeconomic characteristics
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finding that the majority of hospitals penalized tended to be teaching hospitals and hospitals
serving those with lower socioeconomic status.1,2,18,30 For this reason, selected covariates were
related to these factors. Data for characteristics of the county in which the hospital is located
(median household income, private health insurance coverage, public health insurance
coverage, percent of county residents below the poverty level) are drawn from American
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates 2013-2017.31
3.3.2 Study population
From 2013 to 2017, 3,251 hospitals participated in the HRRP. Since data for hospital
ownership are drawn from the AHA Annual Survey, only those hospitals participating in the
HRRP that could be matched to the AHA data sets (n=2,041) and whose ownership type did not
change from 2013 to 2017 which is the period corresponding to the outcome measures for
2016 to 2018 (n=1,927) were eligible for inclusion. Of those, penalized hospitals were the
subject of linear regression analyses.
3.3.3 Measures
The outcome variables are CMS’s 30-day risk standardized mortality rates (RSMR)
corresponding to conditions and procedures (referred to collectively as conditions) of interest
under HRRP (AMI, heart failure, pneumonia, COPD, and CABG) expressed as a percent.32,33,34
The primary predictor was the penalty assessed during the 30-day RSMR measurement
period. Since payment adjustments under HRRP are applied annually, operationalizing the
variable for penalty required computing the average of the payment adjustments applied
during the three-year outcome measurement period. As the RSMR measurement period
corresponds to 12 quarters of payment adjustments, I computed the average penalty over 12
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quarters. During the 2016 mortality measurement period, maximum penalties varied from 0%
(for the first three months of the period before payment adjustments were applied) to 3%
during the final nine months of the measurement period. By the 2018 mortality measurement
period, maximum penalties varied from 2% (for the first three months of the period before
payment adjustments were applied) to 3% during the remainder of the measurement period.
Other covariates represented hospital ownership, the duration for which the hospital’s
home state expanded Medicaid eligibility, teaching hospital status, county-level median
income, and county-level rates of private health insurance coverage, public health insurance
coverage, and poverty. To construct the variable for hospital ownership, I recoded hospitals
whose control codes were classified as “Government, Nonfederal” (state, county, city, citycounty, or hospital district or authority) as public. Those whose control codes were classified as
“Nongovernment, not-for-profit” (church-operated, other not-for-profit) were recoded as
private, non-profit (the reference group). Those whose control codes were classified as
“Investor-owned (for-profit)” (individual, partnership, corporation) were recoded as for-profit.
Since the number of states adopting Medicaid expansion increased during the period
corresponding to the outcome measures, the variable representing the duration of Medicaid
expansion in each hospital’s home state is a score ranging from 0 (expanded Medicaid was not
in place at all during the outcome measurement period) to 1 (Medicaid expansion was in place
during the entire outcome measurement period).
AHA considers hospitals that are members of the Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH)
of the Association of American Medical Colleges as major teaching hospitals. Since teaching
hospital status may also vary during the period corresponding to the outcome measures,
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hospitals were assigned the teaching hospital status in place at the mid-point of the mortality
measurement period. For hospitals classified as major teach hospitals, this variable was coded
as “yes” (reference value = no). Median income was divided by 1000 so that the coefficient
may be interpreted as change in RSMR for each $1,000 increase. The proportion of those in the
county with private health insurance coverage is the proportion of those with employer-based
coverage, directly purchased coverage, or Tricare/military coverage alone or in combination.35
The proportion of those with public health insurance coverage is the proportion of those in the
county with Medicaid/means-tested public coverage alone or in combination.36 The proportion
of those below the poverty level is the proportion of those in the county living below the
poverty level for the past 12 months.37
3.3.4 Analysis plan
First, I compared the characteristics of hospitals that were penalized to those that were
unpenalized and tested whether differences were significant. I then used descriptive statistics
to summarize the characteristics of hospitals included in the analysis (i.e. those that were
penalized), computing frequency distributions of hospital-level characteristics as well as
average penalties and national 30-day mortality rates by ownership type.
These computations were followed by multiple linear regression analysis stratified by
hospital ownership to test the association between penalization and 30-day mortality rate for
each condition by year adjusted by teaching hospital status, Medicaid expansion duration,
county-level rates of public health insurance coverage, private health insurance coverage,
poverty, and county-level median income.
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Finally, I conducted multivariate linear regression analysis with fixed effects to examine
change in RSMR over the 2016 to the 2018 measurement periods by condition stratified by
hospital ownership. The models include variables representing fixed effects for each individual
hospital (!! ), state ($" ), and the period for which RSMR was measured (%# ).
For all analyses, I used R version 3.6.1 with tidyverse (version 1.3.0), dplyr (version
1.0.2), and plm (version 2.4-3) packages.

3.4 Results
3.4.1 Comparison of hospitals penalized to those not penalized
To compare hospitals that were penalized to those that were not, hospitals were
classified as penalized if the average penalty over the outcome measurement period was
greater than zero. Tables 3.1-3.3 summarize comparisons for each outcome measurement
period. From period to period, the number of penalized hospitals increased (from in 2016 to in
2018) while the number of unpenalized hospital decreased (from in 2016 to in 2018).
For all RSMR measurement periods, there were significant differences between
penalized and unpenalized hospitals in the 30-day RSMR for both COPD and heart failure with
penalized hospitals having slightly lower average rates for both COPD and heart failure as
compared to unpenalized hospitals. The COPD RSMR for penalized hospitals was 8.05% in both
2016 and 2017, and 8.37% in 2018. For unpenalized hospitals, the COPD RSMR was 8.39% in
2016, 8.62% in 2017, and 8.90% in 2018. Average COPD RSMR for both penalized and
unpenalized hospitals was slightly higher than the national rates (8.0% in 2016 and 2017 and
8.3% in 2018). In the case of heart failure, the RSMR among penalized hospitals was 12.02% in
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2016 (compared to 12.65% among unpenalized hospitals), 11.81% in 2017 (compared to
12.67% among unpenalized hospitals), and 11.73% in 2018 (compared to 12.29% among
unpenalized hospitals). Average heart failure RSMR for penalized hospitals was slightly lower
than the national rates in 2016 and 2017 (12.1% and 11.9% in 2017, respectively) and about
equivalent to the national rate in 2018 (11.7%)38.
There were also significant differences in the proportion of hospitals located in Medicaid
expansion states for all RSMR measurement periods with a higher proportion of penalized
hospitals than unpenalized hospitals located in Medicaid expansion states in 2014 (during all
three mortality measurement periods) and 2015 (during the 2017 and 2018 mortality
measurement periods).
As compared to non-penalized hospitals, higher proportions of penalized hospitals were
private, non-profit and publicly owned and lower proportions were for-profit enterprises but
these differences were significant in only 2017 and 2018. There were also significant
differences between penalized hospitals and those that were not penalized on other covariates
but these varied by year. Counties where penalized hospitals were located had slightly higher
average rates of public health insurance coverage and lower median incomes than counties
were unpenalized hospitals were located across all three outcome measurement periods.
Counties where penalized hospitals were located had lower average rates of private health
insurance coverage than counties were unpenalized hospitals were located across all three
outcome measurement periods but these differences were significant in 2016 and 2017 only.
Similarly, as compared to unpenalized hospitals, higher proportions of penalized hospitals were
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major teaching institutions and were located in counties with higher poverty rates but these
differences were significant only in 2016.
3.4.2 Summary of hospital characteristics, penalties, and 30-day RSMR, by ownership type
Among the 1,764 hospitals included in the analysis, most (n=1,009; Table 3.4) were
private, non-profit hospitals (57.20%). For-profit institutions represented 26.76% (n=472) of
hospitals in the analysis followed by public hospitals (n=283; 16.04%). Across all types, their
status as major teaching hospitals changed little from year to year: from two to three for-profit
hospitals, 75 to 95 private hospitals, and 12 to 15 public hospitals had major teaching hospital
status. The highest proportion of major teaching hospitals were found among private, nonprofit hospitals (8.45%-9.99%).
Beginning in 2014, the ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility, providing states with full
federal funding for expansion during the first three years and covering at least 90% of
expansion thereafter.39 Subsequently, the number of states opting to expand coverage
increased each year. The proportion of hospitals located in a Medicaid expansion state
increased over time across all hospital types. As the years progressed, the proportion of private
hospitals located in expansion states ranged from 57.68% to 68.48%. The proportion of public
hospitals located in expansion states was comparable to the proportion of for-profit hospitals
(27.92% to 38.16% vs. 28.60% to 38.14%).
The counties where public hospitals were located had, on average, the highest rates of
public health insurance coverage and the lowest rates of private health insurance coverage. In
the counties where public hospitals were located, an average of 21.60% of residents were
covered, alone or in combination, by Medicaid or some other means-tested public health
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insurance while 62.44% held private health insurance coverage. In counties where for-profit
hospitals and private hospitals were located, the average proportion of those with public health
insurance coverage was 20.42% and 20.19%, respectively. In counties where private hospitals
were located, 67.59%, on average, had private health insurance coverage while 63.21% of
residents had private health insurance coverage in counties that were home to for-profit
hospitals.
The counties where public hospitals were located also had, on average, the highest rates
of poverty and lowest median incomes. In those counties, 17.89% of residents on average lived
below the poverty rate and the median income averaged $50,472.71. Counties home to private
and for-profit hospitals had somewhat lower rates of poverty (14.89% and 16.51%,
respectively) and somewhat higher median incomes ($58,142.90 and $53,292.43, respectively).
Table 3.4 shows the average penalty by year for each category of ownership. As
expected, average penalties were at their highest in 2017 when the maximum penalty was in
place. For public hospitals, average penalties ranged from a low of 0.28% in 2014 to 0.60% in
2017. For private, non-profit hospitals, the range was similar (0.28%-0.63%). The lowest
average penalty for-profit hospitals was slightly higher than that for either of the other groups
(0.30%) but reached 0.79% by 2017. Similarly, when the average penalty was computed for the
RSMR measurement periods, the average penalty increased during each subsequent
measurement period with the highest average penalty observed among for-profit hospitals
(0.66%) followed by private hospitals (0.54%).
The average national 30-day RSMR was generally highest among public hospitals over all
conditions for all three measurement periods. The largest gaps were between public hospitals
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and private, non-profit hospitals when comparing pneumonia RSMR. In 2016, the average
pneumonia RSMR following index admission was 16.87% for public hospitals and 16.23% for
private, non-profit hospitals. The gap narrowed slightly in 2017 when the RSMR was 16.45% for
public hospitals and 15.87% for private, non-profit hospitals before increasing again in 2018
(16.36% for public hospitals vs. 15.74% for private, non-profit hospitals). For all three years, the
average pneumonia RSMR among public hospitals was higher than the national RSMR while the
average RSMR among private, non-profit hospitals was lower, or the same as, the national rates
(2016: 16.3%; 2017: 15.9%; 2018: 15.7%).38 The exception to this pattern occurred in 2016,
when the RSMR for CABG among public hospitals (3.48%) dipped slightly below that for forprofit hospitals (3.50%) but both remained higher than the national rate of 3.2%. Since
hospitals must have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis to compute RSMR, the
number of hospitals eligible for inclusion varied by measure. There were the fewest
observations for CABG. Only slightly more than 16% of public hospitals, 36% of private
hospitals, and 30% of for-profit hospitals had observations for CABG. For all other conditions,
the number of observations was equal to or exceeded 50% of the hospitals in each ownership
category.
3.4.3 Multiple linear regression analyses stratified by hospital type, by condition by year
Among public hospitals, the main predictor – the average penalty – was significantly
associated with 30-day RSMR for two conditions after adjusting for covariates: COPD (Table
3.7) and heart failure (Table 3.8). Increase in average penalty was associated with significantly
lower COPD 30-day RSMR each year: in 2016, each percentage point increase in average
penalty was associated with a change in RSMR that was 0.70 percentage points lower in 2016
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(CI=-1.13, -0.26), 0.46 lower (CI=-0.86, -0.07) in 2017, and 0.43 lower (CI=-0.74, -0.11) in 2018.
For heart failure, average penalty was significantly associated with lower 30-day RSMR in 2016
only (Β = −0.63, CI=-1.16, -0.10).
As with public hospitals, among private, non-profit hospitals, average penalty was
associated with significantly lower COPD 30-day RSMR each year. Each unit increase in average
penalty was associated with a change in COPD RSMR that was 0.52 percentage points lower in
2016 (CI=-0.78, -0.27), 0.45 lower in 2017 (CI=-0.63, -0.27), and 0.32 lower in 2018 (CI=-0.48, 0.16). For private, non-profit hospitals, average penalty was also significantly associated with
lower 30-day heart failure RSMR for 2016 (Β = −0.65, CI=-0.97, -0.34) and 2017 (Β = −0.44,
CI=-0.70, -0.19).
Similar to the other two groups of hospitals, among for-profit hospitals, average penalty
was also associated with significantly lower 30-day RSMR for COPD for each year. Increases in
average penalty was associated with a 0.42 percentage point reduction in RSMR in 2016 (CI=0.80, -0.04), 0.61 reduction in 2017 (CI=-0.90, -0.32), and 0.47 reduction in 2018 (CI=-0.70, 0.23). For for-profit hospitals average penalty was also significantly associated with 30-day
RSMR for two additional conditions: CABG and pneumonia. Average penalty was associated
with lower CABG (Table 3.6) 30-day RSMR in 2016 (Β = −0.61, CI=-1.10, -0.12) while, for
pneumonia (Table 3.9), the average penalty was associated with significantly higher 30-day
RSMR in both 2016 and 2017. Each percentage point increase in average penalty was
accompanied by an increase of 0.99 (CI=0.27, 1.71) percentage points in pneumonia RSMR in
2016 and 0.49 percentage points in 2017 (CI=0.01, 0.96).
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For public and for-profit hospitals, average penalty was associated with higher 30-day
RSMR rate for CABG, lower 30-day RSMR for pneumonia in 2016 and 2017, and higher
pneumonia RSMR in 2018. However, the relationships were significant for none of these. The
relationships between average penalty and AMI (Table 3.5) were inconsistent for all hospital
types, varying in the size of the estimates as well as the direction of the effects, but none were
significant.
3.4.4 Multivariate linear regression analyses with fixed effects stratified by hospital type, by
condition by year
Under the fixed effects model, the average penalty was significantly associated only
with heart failure 30-day RSMR and only among public hospitals (Table 3.10). Controlling for
time-invariant characteristics at the hospital level, for a given hospital, each percentage point
increase in average penalty was associated with 0.49 percentage point increase in 30-day RSMR
for heart failure among public hospitals (CI=0.04, 0.95). For public hospitals, the fixed effects
model reversed the direction of the effect observed under the linear regression model for heart
failure as well as for COPD. While the association was not significant, average penalty was
associated with a slight increase in RSMR for COPD (Β = 0.05, CI=-0.32, 0.41). For AMI and
CABG, the direction of the effects was the same under both models while for pneumonia,
average penalty was inversely associated with RSMR under the fixed effects model (ns).
Among private, non-profit and for-profit hospitals, none of the relationships between
average penalty and RSMR were significant under the fixed effects model. As with public
hospitals, for private, non-profit hospitals, the direction of the association between average
penalty and heart failure RSMR was reversed so that increase in average penalty was associated
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with a 0.03 percentage point increase in RSMR (ns). For private, non-profit hospitals, average
penalty and RSMR for COPD remained inversely associated while average penalty and RSMR for
all other conditions were positively correlated (ns). For for-profit hospitals, average penalty
and RSMR for COPD and heart failure remained inversely associated (ns) while the directions of
the associations between average penalty and RSMR for CABG and pneumonia reversed (ns).

3.5 Discussion
Under the stratified multiple linear regression analyses, average penalties were
consistently associated with significantly lower 30-day RSMR for COPD over all measurement
periods for all three types of hospital ownership. For public and private hospitals, the
reductions in 30-day RSMR associated with average penalty declined steadily from 2016 to
2018 while, for for-profit hospital, the greatest reduction was observed for the 2017 RSMR
measurement period. Average penalties were also consistently associated with reductions in
RSMR for heart failure across hospital ownership types. Although not all of the associations
were significant for heart failure, reductions declined steadily from 2016 to 2018 for all three
types of hospitals.
In contrast, under the fixed effects model, the relationships between average penalty
and COPD RSMR did not retain significance and – for public hospitals – the direction of the
association reversed. When examining within-hospital variation, the average penalty remained
significantly associated only with heart failure 30-day RSMR and only among public hospitals.
Here, too, the direction of the association was reversed. While under the multiple linear
regression model, there was an inverse relationship between average penalty and 30-day RSMR
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for heart failure, under the fixed effects model, each percentage point increase in average
penalty was associated with 0.49 percentage point increase in the RSMR. These findings
suggest that failure to correct for time-invariant characteristics may not sufficiently characterize
the effect of penalties on 30-day RSMR when examined over time.
While results largely did not retain significance across models, findings that are
consistent among conditions – like those for COPR and heart failure RSMR – may be worth
exploring further. Initiatives to improve quality of care for COPD and heart failure predate
HRRP. In 2001, for example, the Global Initiative for Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease (GOLD)
program produced its first report with recommendations for the COPD management. Revisions
were issued in 2006 and 2011 with subsequent updates in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016.40 Other
studies have described trials of disease management programs for COPD, care bundles
involving interdisciplinary teams, and pulmonary rehabilitation with varying results.41
In the case of heart failure, in 2005, the American Heart Association launched Get With
The Guidelines® -- Heart Failure (GWTG), a voluntary hospital-based national voluntary quality
improvement program.42 Research from the program found that it was generally associated
with reduced readmission rates but findings associated with mortality were inconsistent.
Jalnapurkar et al. found little to no association between performance on 30 day readmissions
for heart failure patients and risk-adjusted three year mortality or median survival.16 Pandey et
al. concluded that adherence to process of care measures under the program was comparable
at hospitals with high versus low heart failure readmission rates and that overall short- and
long-term clinical outcomes were not different.3
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Under the ACA, both HRRP and the Bundled Payment for Care Improvement Initiative
(BPCI) were launched. Started in 2013, BPCI tested new payment and service delivery models
to reduce Medicare, Medicaid, or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) expenditures
while preserving or enhancing care quality.43 Hundreds of hospitals opted to participate in the
program.43 Under the most popular model among participating hospitals, hospitals selected
the conditions for which they would assume accountability for the costs of care within up to 90
days after hospitalization.44 The most commonly selected conditions were congestive heart
failure and COPD along with pneumonia, sepsis, and AMI.44
Professional initiatives and national efforts to promote quality may have synergistic
effects on institutional efforts to improve care for COPD and heart failure. In this study,
findings for pneumonia and AMI were less consistent than those for COPD and heart failure
across both models as well as across hospital ownership types. Both are conditions whose
acute presentation precipitates medical care. It may be that those conditions receive less
attention from, or are less responsive to, quality of care initiatives.
This study stratified analyses by hospital ownership. Under the first model, findings for
COPD and heart failure suggested that the relationship between average penalty and RSMR
behaved similarly across ownership types raising the possibility that trends in quality-of-care
initiatives have broad influence. While findings under the fixed effects model failed – with one
exception – to reach significance, exploring the interaction of ownership with penalization may
help describe some differences in how hospitals respond to incentives under HRRP. Under the
fixed effects model, penalization was associated with increases in RSMR for four of the five
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conditions among both public hospitals and private, non-profit hospitals while, for for-profit
hospitals, penalization was associated with increases in RSMR for two of the five conditions.
Limitations
The study relies on secondary data which were not gathered with this analysis in mind.
Penalties are applied annually while 30-day RSMR is based on data from index admissions over
a three-year period. To help address this, the primary predictor, average penalty, represented
the average of the penalties assessed over the 36 months coinciding with the outcome
measurement period. However, the outcome measure may not be sufficiently sensitive to
improvements in care quality that may have been associated with HRRP penalties. Also, under
the study design, it is not possible to ascertain that the exposure preceded the outcome in a
way that could suggest causality.45–48
Confounding may have been a potential source of bias. While the models include an
array of covariates, it is possible that they are underspecified. Other investigators have
included patient-level covariates in their analyses, but findings are not consistent across
studies. Papadogeorgou et al. included indicators for patient-level comorbidities in their study
focusing on AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia and found that the introduction of HRRP was
not significantly associated with mortality following admission for AMI and heart failure but was
significantly associated with an increase in mortality following pneumonia admission.
Examining the same conditions, Gupta et al. found that HRRP implementation was significantly
associated with an increase in 30-day mortality following hospitalization for pneumonia as well
as heart failure but not for AMI.9
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This study does not include patient-level characteristics. Instead, it relies on countylevel characteristics and includes a variable representing the duration of Medicaid expansion in
the state where the hospital is located, an important indicator of the resources available to
hospitals that may offset penalties. Nevertheless, if the unmeasured variables are associated
with mortality, then failure to control for them may overestimate or mischaracterize any
observed association. The fixed effects model was applied to control for time-invariant
characteristics and explore within-hospital variation.
Hospital ownership may be endogenous to the characteristics of the area in which a
hospital is located.5,21,23,49,50 If hospitals preferentially locate in certain areas and these areas
also have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. Similarly, if hospitals preferentially serve certain types of patients and these
patients have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. To address this, the models include covariates representing area county-level
characteristics but it is possible that these may not sufficiently manage endogeneity.

3.6 Conclusion
This study examined the association between the national 30-day RSMR for AMI, heart
failure, COPD, CABG and pneumonia penalties assessed for readmission under HRRP averaged
over the mortality measurement period. This study was distinguished from others examining
the relationship between hospital ownership and quality of care, hospital ownership and
patient outcomes, and HRRP implementation and mortality by its focus on the relationship
between penalties assessed under HRRP and performance against national 30-day RSMR.
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When examined for each outcome measurement period and stratified by ownership,
average payment adjustments under HRRP were associated with significantly lower 30-day
RSMR for COPD. Average penalties were also consistently associated with reductions in the
average RSMR for heart failure across hospital ownership types and from year to year, although
not all of the associations were significant. When a fixed effects model was applied, only the
association between average penalty and heart failure RSMR among public hospitals remained
significant with the direction of the relationship reversed. Even so, findings may reflect a
confluence of trends in care quality for selected conditions – like COPD and heart failure – that
have been the subject of quality improvement initiatives in health care settings. Variations
among hospital ownership types suggest that hospitals may respond to the incentives
introduced by HRRP in different ways such that ownership interacts with average penalty.

3.7 Tables and figures
Table 3-1. Comparison of penalized hospitals to unpenalized hospitals: 2016 outcome measurement period
Characteristic

Penalized (n=1669)

Frequency

Unpenalized (n=221)

%

Frequency

%

Test statistic
"!

Ownership
Private, non-profit

950

56.92

114

51.58

3.46

Public

266

15.94

34

15.38

For-Profit

453

27.14

73

33.03

2014

759

45.48

80

36.20

6.43*

2015

882

52.85

101

45.70

3.71

104

6.57

8

5.06

0.32

Medicaid expansion

Teaching hospital

84

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

1458

65.41

9.46

196

67.47

8.93

!
3.01**

df
257.56

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

1458

20.58

6.80

195

18.86

6.26

-3.58***

259.2

% below poverty level
(county)

1467

15.88

5.73

198

15.02

4.97

-2.24*

273.02

Median income (county)

1451

55,553.26

16117.51

194

56,881.86

13,118.89

U=156465*

1267

14.09

1.26

92

13.94

1.38

-0.98

102.39

525

3.37

0.90

57

3.22

0.76

-1.33

73.99

1588

8.05

1.19

114

8.39

1.22

2.92**

129.08

1596

12.02

1.51

122

12.65

1.39

4.82***

143.82

1622

16.39

2.27

136

16.68

2.04

1.55

164.46

Average 30-day RSMR
rate
AMI
2016
CABG
2016
COPD
2016
Heart failure
2016
Pneumonia
2016

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3-2 Comparison of penalized hospitals to unpenalized hospitals: 2017 outcome measurement period
Characteristic

Penalized (n=1723)

Frequency

Unpenalized (n=167)

%

Frequency

%

Test statistic
"!

Ownership
Private, non-profit

982

56.99

82

49.10

10.19**

Public

279

16.19

21

12.57

For-Profit

462

26.81

64

38.32

2014

779

45.21

60

35.93

4.95*

2015

909

52.76

74

44.31

4.02*

2016

957

55.54

87

52.10

0.60

107

6.62

8

5.19

0.26

SD

n

Medicaid expansion

Teaching hospital

n

mean

mean

SD

!

df

85

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

1505

65.45

9.42

149

67.65

9.19

2.77**

180.19

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

1505

20.53

6.77

148

18.82

6.46

-3.07**

180.23

% below poverty level
(county)

1514

15.85

5.70

151

14.99

5.09

-1.95

189.58

Median income (county)

1498

55,530.89

15,972.09

147

57,534.69

13,788.43

U=124868**

1271

13.58

1.22

56

13.57

1.38

-0.07

58.86

541

3.30

0.90

38

3.22

0.88

-0.55

42.62

1608

8.05

1.16

70

8.62

1.26

3.74***

74.13

1625

11.81

1.62

74

12.67

1.48

4.85***

81.15

1654

16.03

2.10

85

16.18

1.86

0.69

95.32

Average 30-day RSMR
AMI
2017
CABG
2017
COPD
2017
Heart failure
2017
Pneumonia
2017

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3-3 Comparison of penalized hospitals to unpenalized hospitals: 2018 outcome measurement period
Characteristic

Penalized (n=1752)

Frequency

Unpenalized (n=144)

%

Frequency

%

Test statistic
"!

Ownership
Private, non-profit

1001

57.13

67

46.53

10.73**

Public

280

15.98

20

13.89

For-Profit

471

26.88

57

39.58

2014

790

45.09

50

34.72

5.39*

2015

923

52.68

62

43.06

4.56*

2016

973

55.54

73

50.69

1.07

2017

973

55.54

73

50.69

1.07

91

5.82

7

5.34

0.00

SD

n

Medicaid expansion

Teaching hospital

n

mean

mean

SD

!

df

86

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

1533

65.53

9.37

126

67.03

9.73

1.67

144.73

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

1530

20.48

6.75

128

19.18

6.67

-2.12*

149.6

% below poverty level
(county)

1540

15.82

5.66

130

15.25

5.38

-1.17

154.13

Median income (county)

1523

55,554.76

15,896.67

127

57,335.93

14,210.10

U=108414*

1268

13.20

1.22

39

13.23

1.28

0.14

40.17

540

3.25

0.96

26

3.13

1.10

-0.56

26.86

1621

8.37

1.18

54

8.90

1.38

2.78**

55.65

1627

11.73

1.75

57

12.29

1.66

2.51*

60.44

1662

15.94

2.10

65

15.66

1.85

-1.15

70.60

Average 30-day mortality
rate
AMI
2018
CABG
2018
COPD
2018
Heart failure
2018
Pneumonia
2018

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3-4 Characteristics of penalized hospitals and counties by hospital ownership type
Characteristic

Hospital ownership type
Private, non-profit

Public
n=283

For-profit

n=1009

n=472

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Teaching
hospital
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

15
14
13
13
12

5.66
5.11
4.92
4.96
4.86

95
91
94
75
78

9.96
9.46
9.99
8.45
9.18

3
2
2
3
2

1.00
<1.00
<1.00
1.00
<1.00

Medicaid
expansion state
2014
2015
2016
2017

79
92
108
108

27.92
32.51
38.16
38.16

582
678
691
691

57.68
67.20
68.48
68.48

135
159
180
180

28.60
33.69
38.14
38.14

Average penalty
(annual)
2013
2014

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

283
283

0.29
0.28

0.35
0.38

1006
1009

0.30
0.28

0.34
0.37

471
472

0.32
0.30

0.33
0.37

87

2015
2016
2017

283
283
283

0.47
0.48
0.60

0.52
0.52
0.69

1009
1009
1009

0.55
0.54
0.63

0.61
0.60
0.68

472
472
472

0.67
0.65
0.79

0.70
0.68
0.73

Average penalty
(RSMR period)
2016
2017
2018

283
283
283

0.31
0.39
0.49

0.32
0.39
0.48

1006
1006
1009

0.33
0.43
0.54

0.34
0.44
0.54

471
471
472

0.37
0.51
0.66

0.33
0.45
0.56

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

255

62.44

9.95

860

67.59

8.75

427

63.21

9.21

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

255

21.60

7.53

861

20.19

6.51

425

20.42

6.68

% below poverty
level (county)

256

17.89

6.85

868

14.89

5.21

427

16.51

5.35

Median income
(county)

254

50,472.71

15,718.62

857

58,142.90

16,424.23

423

53,292.43

13,630.94

163
153
149

14.33
13.87
13.62

1.20
1.22
1.33

833
821
806

13.96
13.48
13.09

1.28
1.24
1.22

333
324
319

14.25
13.72
13.29

1.22
1.13
1.13

46
46
46

3.48
3.62
3.64

1.08
1.33
1.45

367
364
360

3.29
3.17
3.09

0.90
0.84
0.82

146
146
137

3.50
3.51
3.54

0.80
0.78
0.99

262
253
250

8.22
8.24
8.54

1.10
1.15
1.15

978
970
968

8.04
8.03
8.36

1.20
1.14
1.19

423
416
411

8.00
8.00
8.32

1.21
1.19
1.20

259
255
250

12.35
12.17
12.05

1.33
1.45
1.64

987
984
971

12.01
11.80
11.70

1.58
1.67
1.77

428
419
415

11.96
11.68
11.59

1.46
1.60
1.75

274
271
267

16.87
16.45
16.36

2.33
2.13
2.03

996
990
983

16.23
15.87
15.74

2.15
2.06
2.11

435
428
423

16.55
16.19
16.11

2.43
2.13
2.08

Average 30-day
RSMR
AMI
2016
2017
2018
CABG
2016
2017
2018
COPD
2016
2017
2018
Heart
failure
2016
2017
2018
Pneumonia
2016
2017
2018

Table 3-5 Multiple linear regression stratified by ownership: AMI 30-day mortality by year
Covariates
2016

Year
2017

2018

88

Public
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

0.33

0.35

-0.36, 0.01

0.27

0.28

-0.28, 0.81

0.39

0.29

-0.18, 0.96

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

0.69

0.38

-0.06, 1.44

-0.02

0.39

-0.79, 0.75

-0.10

0.43

-0.96, 0.76

Medicaid
expansion
duration

0.83

0.71

-0.57, 2.23

0.82

0.44

-0.04, 1.69

0.27

0.41

-0.54, 1.08

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.01

0.03

-0.06, 0.04

-0.02

0.03

-0.08, 0.03

0.01

0.03

-0.04, 0.07

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.03

0.04

-0.11, 0.05

-0.06

0.04

-0.15, 0.03

-0.01

0.05

-0.11, 0.09

% below poverty
level (county)

-0.02

0.04

-0.09, 0.05

-0.04

0.04

-0.11, 0.04

-0.02

0.04

-0.10, 0.07

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.02

0.01

-0.04,
<0.01

-0.03**

0.01

-0.06, 0.01

-0.03*

0.01

-0.06, <0.01

Private, non-profit
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

0.02

0.15

-0.27, 0.31

-0.01

0.11

-0.23, 0.22

0.05

0.09

-0.12, 0.23

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.63***

0.16

-0.94, 0.32

-0.71***

0.15

-1.00, 0.41

-0.69***

0.16

-1.00, -0.37

Medicaid
expansion
duration

-0.34

0.30

-0.93, 0.25

-0.40*

0.19

-0.77, 0.03

-0.24

0.15

-0.54, 0.07

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.02

0.01

-0.01, 0.04

0.02

0.01

-0.01, 0.04

<0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.03

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.01

0.02

-0.05, 0.03

<-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.04

-0.02

0.02

-0.05, 0.02

% below poverty
level (county)

0.02

0.02

-0.01, 0.06

0.02

0.02

-0.02, 0.05

<0.01

0.02

-0.03, 0.04

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.01**

<0.01

-0.02, <0.01

-0.01*

<0.01

-0.02, <-0.1

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.03, -0.01

For-profit
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.08

0.23

-0.53, 0.37

-0.02

0.17

-0.35, 0.31

0.08

0.14

-0.20, 0.35

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

0.27

0.86

-1.42, 1.96

-0.32

0.80

-1.89, 1.26

-0.52

0.67

-1.84, 0.79

Medicaid
expansion
duration

0.49

0.46

-0.41, 1.38

0.06

0.26

-0.45, 0.58

0.31

0.23

-0.15, 0.76
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% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.01

0.02

-0.02, 0.04

0.01

0.02

-0.02, 0.04

<-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.03

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.06*

0.03

-0.11, <0.01

-0.04

0.03

-0.09, 0.02

-0.07*

0.03

-0.12, -0.01

% below poverty
level (county)

0.03

0.03

-0.03, 0.08

0.02

0.03

-0.03, 0.07

0.01

0.03

-0.04, 0.06

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.02*

0.01

-0.04, <0.01

-0.01

0.01

-0.03,
<0.01

-0.02*

0.01

-0.04, <0.01

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 3-6 Multiple linear regression stratified by ownership: CABG 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Public
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

0.26

0.75

-1.27, 1.80

0.79

0.77

-0.80, 2.38

0.71

0.54

-0.39, 1.82

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.12

0.58

-1.30, 1.06

-0.35

0.70

-1.79, 1.09

-1.34*

0.63

-2.62, -0.05

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

0.71

1.94

-3.26, 4.69

0.56

1.41

-2.32, 3.45

0.28

1.05

-1.87, 2.44

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.02

0.05

-0.09, 0.13

-0.02

0.07

-0.15, 0.12

-0.05

0.06

-0.18, 0.08

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.07

0.10

-0.28, 0.15

-0.13

0.13

-0.40, 0.14

-0.15

0.12

-0.40, 0.10

% below poverty
level (county)

0.04

0.10

-0.16, 0.25

0.11

0.12

-0.14, 0.36

0.13

0.11

-0.09, 0.35

Median income
(county)

-0.03

0.03

-0.09, 0.03

-0.02

0.04

-0.10, 0.06

0.01

0.03

-0.06, 0.08

Private, non-profit
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

0.06

0.18

-0.29, 0.41

0.07

0.12

-0.17, 0.31

0.08

0.09

-0.10, 0.27

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.36**

0.12

-0.60, 0.11

-0.38***

0.11

-0.60, 0.16

-0.52***

0.11

-0.74, -0.31

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

-0.07

0.30

-0.66, 0.51

0.19

0.17

-0.15, 0.53

-0.02

0.14

-0.29, 0.25
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% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

<-0.01

0.01

-0.03, 0.02

-0.01

0.01

-0.03, 0.02

0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.03

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.02

0.02

-0.06, 0.02

-0.03

0.02

-0.06, 0.01

-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.03

% below poverty
level (county)

-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.03

-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.03

-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.03

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.02***

0.01

-0.03, 0.01

-0.02***

0.01

-0.03, 0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.03, -0.01

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.61*

0.25

-1.10, 0.12

-0.28

0.20

-0.67, 0.11

0.12

0.21

-0.30, 0.53

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.47

0.80

-2.06, 1.12

-1.02

0.78

-2.58, 0.53

0.28

0.96

-1.62, 2.19

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

-0.35

0.45

-1.24, 0.53

-0.10

0.27

-0.64, 0.44

0.05

0.28

-0.51, 0.62

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.03

0.02

<-0.01,
0.06

0.03

0.02

<-0.01,
0.06

0.03

0.02

-0.01, 0.07

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.03

0.03

-0.03, 0.09

0.01

0.03

-0.05, 0.07

-0.02

0.04

-0.10, 0.06

% below poverty
level (county)

0.02

0.03

-0.04, 0.08

0.03

0.03

-0.02, 0.09

0.02

0.04

-0.06, 0.10

Median income
(county)

<-0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.01

<-0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.01

-0.02*

0.01

-0.04, <-0.01

For-profit

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 3-7 Multiple linear regression stratified by ownership: COPD 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Public
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.70**

0.22

-1.13, 0.26

-0.46*

0.20

-0.86, 0.07

-0.43**

0.16

-0.74, -0.11

Teaching
hospital (ref =
no)

0.07

0.30

-0.53, 0.67

-0.46

0.37

-1.19, 0.27

-0.29

0.34

-0.97, 0.39

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

0.47

0.49

-0.49, 1.44

-0.02

0.32

-0.65, 0.61

-0.24

0.26

-0.75, 0.27
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% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

<-0.01

0.02

-0.03, 0.03

0.01

0.02

-0.02, 0.05

0.04*

0.02

<0.01, 0.07

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.01

0.03

-0.06, 0.04

0.01

0.03

-0.05, 0.07

0.03

0.03

-0.02, 0.09

% below poverty
level (county)

<0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.04

<-0.01

0.02

-0.05, 0.04

<0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.05

Median income
(county)

<-0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.02

<-0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.02

<-0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.02

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.52***

0.13

-0.78, 0.27

-0.45***

0.09

-0.63, 0.27

-0.32***

0.08

-0.48, -0.16

Teaching
hospital (ref =
no)

-0.27

0.15

-0.56, 0.02

-0.46***

0.13

-0.72, 0.20

-0.48**

0.16

-0.78, -0.17

Medicaid
expansion state
(ref = no)

-0.31

0.26

-0.82, 0.20

-0.17

0.15

-0.47, 0.13

-0.08

0.14

-0.35, 0.19

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.02

0.01

<-0.01,
0.04

0.01

0.01

-0.01, 0.03

<0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.03

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.01

0.02

-0.02, 0.04

0.01

0.02

-0.03, 0.04

-0.02

0.02

-0.05, 0.02

% below poverty
level (county)

-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.02

-0.02

0.02

-0.05, 0.01

-0.01

0.02

-0.05, 0.02

Median income
(county)

-0.01**

<0.01

-0.02, <0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.02, 0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.03, -0.01

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.42*

0.19

-0.80, 0.04

-0.61***

0.15

-0.90, 0.32

-0.47***

0.12

-0.70, -0.23

Teaching
hospital (ref =
no)

0.05

0.85

-1.63, 1.73

-0.37

0.85

-2.05, 1.30

-0.26

0.70

-1.64, 1.11

Medicaid
expansion state
(ref = no)

-0.16

0.40

-0.95, 0.64

-0.03

0.25

-0.52, 0.45

0.09

0.21

-0.32, 0.51

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.02

0.01

-0.01, 0.05

0.01

0.01

-0.01, 0.04

0.02

0.01

-0.01, 0.05

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.01

0.02

-0.05, 0.04

-0.02

0.02

-0.07, 0.03

-0.03

0.03

-0.08, 0.02

Private, non-profit

For-profit
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% below poverty
level (county)

-0.03

0.02

-0.07, 0.02

-0.02

0.02

-0.06, 0.03

-0.02

0.02

-0.07, 0.03

Median income
(county)

-0.03**

0.01

-0.04, 0.01

-0.02**

0.01

-0.04, 0.01

-0.03**

0.01

-0.04, -0.01

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 3-8 Multiple linear regression stratified by ownership: heart failure 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Public
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.63*

0.27

-1.16, 0.10

-0.46

0.24

-0.94, 0.02

-0.19

0.23

-0.63, 0.26

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.81*

0.38

-1.56, 0.06

-0.97

0.41*

-1.78, -0.15

-1.64***

0.46

-2.55, -0.73

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

0.24

0.59

-0.92, 1.40

0.65

0.38

-0.11, 1.40

0.73*

0.36

0.03, 1.43

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.02

0.02

-0.02, 0.06

<0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.04

<0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.05

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.02

0.03

-0.08, 0.04

-0.03

0.04

-0.10, 0.04

-0.08

0.04

-0.16, <0.01

% below poverty
level (county)

0.01

0.03

-0.04, 0.06

-0.01

0.03

-0.07, 0.04

0.02

0.03

-0.05, 0.08

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.02

0.01

-0.04,
<0.01

-0.03**

0.01

-0.05, -0.01

-0.03*

0.01

-0.05, <-0.01

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.65***

0.16

-0.97, 0.34

-0.44***

0.13

-0.70, -0.19

-0.20

0.11

-0.42, 0.02

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.97***

0.18

-1.32, 0.61

-1.12***

0.18

-1.48, -0.76

-1.26***

0.21

-1.68, -0.84

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

-0.13

0.32

-0.76, 0.50

-0.17

0.21

-0.59, 0.24

-0.03

0.19

-0.40, 0.35

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.04**

0.01

0.01, 0.06

0.04**

0.01

0.02, 0.07

0.05**

0.02

0.02, 0.08

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

-0.01

0.02

-0.05, 0.03

0.02

0.02

-0.03, 0.06

0.01

0.02

-0.03, 0.06

Private, non-profit
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% below poverty
level (county)

-0.02

0.02

-0.06, 0.02

-0.04

0.02

-0.08,
<0.01

-0.06**

0.02

-0.11, -0.02

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.03***

0.01

-0.04, 0.02

-0.04***

0.01

-0.05, -0.02

-0.05***

0.01

-0.06, -0.04

For-profit
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.44

0.23

-0.89,
<0.01

-0.31

0.19

-0.68, 0.06

-0.23

0.17

-0.56, 0.10

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-1.75

0.99

-3.71, 0.20

-2.48*

1.08

-4.61, -0.36

-1.03

0.98

-2.96, 0.89

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

-0.73

0.47

-1.66, 0.19

-0.47

0.31

-1.08, 0.14

-0.35

0.29

-0.92, 0.23

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.08***

0.02

0.05, 0.11

0.10***

0.02

0.06, 0.13

0.10***

0.02

0.06, 0.14

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.01

0.03

-0.04, 0.07

0.03

0.03

-0.03, 0.09

0.03

0.04

-0.04, 0.10

% below poverty
level (county)

0.01

0.03

-0.04, 0.07

0.01

0.03

-0.05, 0.07

-0.02

0.03

-0.08, 0.05

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.04***

0.01

-0.06, 0.03

-0.05***

0.01

-0.07, -0.03

0.05***

0.01

-0.07, -0.03

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 3-9 Multiple linear regression stratified by ownership: pneumonia 30-day RSMR by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Public
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.31

0.47

-1.25, 0.62

-0.07

0.38

-0.81, 0.67

0.04

0.30

-0.56, -0.64

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.93

0.68

-2.28, 0.42

-0.79

0.64

-2.06, 0.48

-1.31*

0.63

-2.55, -0.07

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

-1.01

1.03

-3.03, 1.02

-1.20*

0.58

-2.35, -0.05

-0.45

0.48

-1.39, 0.48

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.04

0.03

-0.02, 0.10

0.05

0.03

-0.01, 0.11

0.06*

0.03

<0.01, 0.12

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.03

0.05

-0.07, 0.13

0.09

0.05

-0.01, 0.20

0.07

0.05

-0.03, 0.17
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% below poverty
level (county)

0.02

0.04

-0.06, 0.11

0.02

0.04

-0.06, 0.11

-0.01

0.04

-0.09, 0.07

Median income
(county)/1000

0.01

0.02

-0.02, 0.04

0.03*

0.02

<0.01, 0.07

0.01

0.02

-0.02, 0.04

Private, non-profit
Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

-0.34

0.23

-0.79, 0.11

-0.03

0.17

-0.36, 0.30

0.10

0.14

-0.18, 0.37

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-1.09***

0.26

-1.60, 0.59

-1.12***

0.24

-1.59, -0.65

-1.12***

0.27

-1.65, -0.59

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

-0.25

0.46

-1.14, 0.65

-0.23

0.28

-0.77, 0.31

-0.09

0.24

-0.56, 0.39

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.04*

0.02

<0.01,
0.08

0.03

0.02

<-0.01,
0.07

0.01

0.02

-0.03, 0.05

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.02

0.03

-0.03, 0.08

<0.01

0.03

-0.05, 0.06

-0.02

0.03

-0.08, 0.03

% below poverty
level (county)

-0.05

0.03

-0.10, 0.01

-0.03

0.03

-0.08, 0.03

-0.04

0.03

-0.10, 0.01

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.04***

0.01

-0.06, 0.03

-0.04***

0.01

-0.05, -0.02

-0.04***

0.01

-0.06, -0.03

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Weighted
penalty

0.99**

0.37

0.27, 1.71

0.49*

0.24

0.01, 0.96

0.36

0.19

-0.01, 0.74

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-1.03

1.63

-4.23, 2.17

0.31

1.40

-2.45, 3.06

1.38

1.13

-0.85, 3.61

Medicaid
expansion state
duration

-1.12

0.76

-2.61, 0.38

-0.43

0.39

-1.20, 0.34

-0.38

0.33

-1.03, 0.28

% with private
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.09***

0.03

0.04, 0.14

0.07**

0.02

0.02, 0.11

0.05*

0.02

<0.01, 0.09

% with public
health insurance
coverage
(county)

0.03

0.05

-0.06, 0.12

0.01

0.04

-0.07, 0.09

-0.01

0.04

-0.09, 0.07

% below poverty
level (county)

-0.07

0.04

-0.15, 0.02

-0.10**

0.04

-0.17, -0.03

-0.10**

0.04

-0.18, -0.03

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.06***

0.02

-0.09, 0.03

-0.07***

0.01

-0.10, -0.05

-0.07***

0.01

-0.09, -0.04

For-profit

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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Table 3-10 Multivariate linear regression of average penalty on 30-day RSMR with fixed effects for hospital, year,
and state by ownership (fully adjusted)
Outcome

Ownership
Private, non-profit

Public

For-profit

RSMR

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

AMI

0.28

0.25

-0.20, 0.76

<0.01

0.11

-0.21, 0.21

0.31

0.17

-0.02, 0.64

CABG

0.39

0.39

-0.38, 1.17

0.02

0.14

-0.26, 0.31

0.05

0.27

-0.48, 0.58

COPD

0.05

0.19

-0.32, 0.41

-0.15

0.09

-0.34, 0.03

-0.16

0.13

-0.41, 0.09

Heart failure

0.49*

0.23

0.04, 0.95

0.03

0.12

-0.20, 0.26

-0.20

0.18

-0.55, 0.15

Pneumonia

-0.30

0.29

-0.87, 0.26

0.08

0.14

-0.19, 0.35

-0.16

0.21

-0.57, 0.25

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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4 Evaluating the interaction of hospital ownership with penalization:
how are these associated with the 30-day risk standardized mortality
rate for targeted conditions as penalties were phased in?
4.1 Abstract
Background: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) requires Medicare to
reduce payments to hospitals with relatively high readmission rates. While the implementation
of the program has been accompanied by reductions in readmission rates, some have
expressed concerns about unintended consequences, including harm to patient care and even
death. Under HRRP, hospitals serving a high proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients, like public hospitals, have been more likely to receive financial penalties, potentially
impeding their ability to invest resources in improving patient outcomes. This study examines,
among penalized hospitals, the interaction of hospital ownership and average penalty and its
association with 30-day RSMR.
Methods: This study merged data from CMS Hospital Compare Complications and Deaths –
Hospital (2016-2018) publicly-available datasets with data from the American Hospital
Association (AHA) Annual Survey proprietary datasets (2013-2017) as well as from Kaiser Health
News (KHN) which formats payment adjustment factor data from the CMS Acute Inpatient
Prospective Payment System Final Rule (2013-2017) in publicly-available .csv files. This was
supplemented with data from American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates 2013-2017.
Multiple linear regression was used to examine the association of the interaction of hospital
ownership with average penalty and 30-day RSMR by condition for each year while multivariate
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linear regression of the same association employing fixed effects was used to examine change
in RSMR by condition for any given hospital.
Results: Of the 1,764 penalized hospitals that were the subject of the analyses, most (57.20%)
were private, non-profit hospitals (reference group). Compared to private, non-profit
ownership, for public hospitals each additional percentage point increase in average penalty
was associated with an increase in 30-day RSMR for CABG across all years but the relationship
was significant only for CABG in 2018 where each increase in the average penalty was
associated with 0.87 point increase in RSMR. For for-profit hospitals, each additional
percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with an increase in 30-day RSMR
for pneumonia across all years but the relationship was significant only in 2016, when an
additional percentage point increase in the penalty was associated with 0.93 percentage point
increase in 30-day RSMR. Under the fixed effects model, the interaction of hospital ownership
and average penalty was significantly associated with 30-day RSMR only for publicly owned
hospitals following admission for CABG (0=0.80) and heart failure (0=0.51). For CABG, this was
consistent with the direction of the associations found under the previous model where there
was a positive correlation between average penalty and RSMR each year. However, the
direction of the effect of average penalty on heart failure RSMR is, under the fixed effects
model, reversed.
Conclusions: While the associations between the interaction of hospital ownership with
average penalty and 30-day RSMR were rarely significant under either model, examining withingroup variation under the second model lent some reinforcement to correlational trends
observed from year to year. However, for heart failure, the relationship between average
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penalty and RSMR among public hospitals was negative when examined by year but
significantly positive under the fixed effects model suggesting that failure to correct for timeinvariant characteristics may not sufficiently characterize the effect of penalization modified by
hospital ownership on 30-day RSMR.
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4.2 Introduction
The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), launched in 2013, is an aspect of
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. HRRP requires the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to reduce Medicare payments to hospitals with
relatively high readmission rates (i.e. rates of unplanned readmissions 30 days after initial
hospitalization) for patients in Medicare.1–8 Under HRRP, the payment adjustment was
implemented in phases. During the first year in FY2013, the maximum penalty assessed was 1%
of a hospital’s Medicare reimbursement. In FY2014, that increased to 2% and reached the
current maximum of 3% in FY2015.1 The conditions initially included in the program were acute
myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure (the leading cause of readmissions among Medicare
beneficiaries),9 and pneumonia.2 The list of conditions expanded in 2015 to include acute
exacerbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and elective surgery for hip and
knee replacement.2 In 2017, CMS added the procedure coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) to
the list.10 Conditions are identified based on primary discharge diagnosis and hospitals must
have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis to be measured.2,5
While the implementation of the program has been accompanied by reductions in
readmission rates,11 some have expressed concerns about unintended consequences, including
harm to patient care and even death.4,6,8,9,12–14 Introducing incentives to reduce readmissions
may motivate health care providers to use inappropriate care strategies, such as discouraging
triage for emergency care or delaying readmissions.9 However, the evidence for mortality
associated with HRRP is mixed with some studies finding that reductions in hospital
readmission rates were correlated with reductions in mortality rates, others finding that
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implementation of the HRRP was associated with a subsequent decrease in readmissions and
an increase in mortality, and still others finding that decreases in readmissions had no
significant impact on mortality.7,9,13,15 Inconsistencies in previous findings also extended to the
disease conditions which focused on the conditions initially included in the program: AMI,
heart failure, and pneumonia. One study found that the introduction of HRRP had no effect on
mortality following admission for AMI and heart failure but was significantly correlated with an
increase in mortality following pneumonia admission.8 Another study found that HRRP
implementation was significantly associated with an increase in 30-day mortality following
hospitalization for pneumonia as well as heart failure but not for AMI.14 A third study found
that reductions in readmissions were significantly correlated with reductions in 30-day
mortality rates after admission for all three of the same conditions.13 Two studies examining
only heart failure both showed HRRP associated with reductions in readmissions but only one
demonstrated a significant association with mortality following hospitalization, showing
increases in mortality at 30 days and one year.9,15
Under HRRP, hospitals serving a high proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients, like public hospitals, have been more likely to receive financial penalties, potentially
impeding their ability to invest resources in improving patient outcomes.14,16 If these hospitals
find that their ability to provide care is hindered as a result of financial penalties, the potential
for harm exists even when there is little or no change in readmissions.7 Public hospitals may
find it particularly challenging to address causes of readmissions. Penalties for readmissions
may further strain their limited resources, inhibiting their ability to invest in effective transitions
of care programs or other efforts to improve care quality and patient outcomes.4,12,14
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In the previous chapter, average penalties under HRRP were associated with significant
reductions in the 30-day risk standardized mortality rate (RSMR) for COPD when stratified by
ownership and examined separately by year. Average penalties were also consistently
associated with reductions in the average RSMR for heart failure across hospital ownership
types and from year to year, although not all of the associations were significant. When a fixed
effects model was applied, however, the association between average penalty and RSMR was
significant only for heart failure among public hospitals with the relationship reversed such that
each percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with 0.49 percentage point
increase in 30-day RSMR. Variations among hospital ownership types suggest that hospitals
may respond to the incentives introduced by HRRP so that ownership interacts with average
penalty. Accordingly, this chapter examines the interaction of hospital ownership and average
penalty and its association with 30-day RSMR through two models: 1) a multivariate linear
regression of 30-day RSMR by condition for each year and 2) a multivariate linear regression of
30-day RSMR with fixed effects by condition.
There is previous research on the relationship between hospital ownership and quality
of care as well as between hospital ownership and patient outcomes.5,17–23 There is also
research on the relationship between HRRP implementation and mortality.7–9,12–15 This project,
however, is distinguished by its focus on the interaction of hospital ownership with penalties
assessed for readmission under HRRP and the association with 30-day RSMR examined during
the first year of the HRRP. Understanding how hospitals ownership influences the relationship
between penalties and RSMR over time may offer insight about how hospitals evolve in their
response to pay-for-performance programs.
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4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Data sources
Hospital-level data representing the outcome (30-day RSMR for conditions of interest
under HRRP) are drawn from CMS Hospital Compare Complications and Deaths – Hospital
(2016-2018) publicly-available datasets.24–26 CMS’s RSMR is based on data from index
admissions over a three-year period and hospitals must have at least 25 initial hospitalizations
for a diagnosis to be measured.27–29 The RSMR is expressed as a percent and calculated as the
ratio of the number of "predicted" deaths to the number of "expected" deaths at a given
hospital within 30 days of index admission, multiplied by the national observed mortality rate.
Each hospitals’ penalty under HRRP for each year during the period are obtained from Kaiser
Health News (KHN) which operationalizes the payment adjustment factor from the CMS Acute
Inpatient Prospective Payment System Final Rule (2013-2017) in convenient, publicly available
.csv files operationalized as the percentage by which payments are reduced.
Data representing hospital ownership, the effect measure modifier, and teaching
hospital status are drawn from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey
proprietary datasets (2013-2017).30–34 Other studies of the relationship between hospital
characteristics and performance under HRRP have examined the influence of teaching hospital
status and local socioeconomic characteristics finding that the majority of hospitals penalized
tended to be teaching hospitals and hospitals serving those with lower socioeconomic
status.1,2,18,35 For this reason, selected covariates were related to these factors. Data for
characteristics of the county in which the hospital is located (median household income, private
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health insurance coverage, public health insurance coverage, percent of county residents below
the poverty level) are drawn from American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates 20132017.36
4.3.2 Study population
From 2013 to 2017, 3,251 hospitals participated in the HRRP. Since data for hospital
ownership are drawn from the AHA Annual Survey, only those hospitals participating in the
HRRP that could be matched to the AHA data sets (n=2,041) and whose ownership type did not
change from 2013 to 2017 which is the period corresponding to the outcome measures for
2016 to 2018 (n=1,927) were eligible for inclusion. Data for this study are drawn from the
1,764 hospitals that were penalized.
4.3.3 Measures
The outcome variables are CMS’s 30-day RSMR (expressed as a percent) corresponding
to conditions and procedures (referred to collectively as conditions) of interest under HRRP:
AMI, heart failure, pneumonia, COPD, and CABG.37,38,39
The primary predictor was the interaction of hospital ownership (public, private, nonprofit, or for-profit) with penalty for each condition by year. Hospital ownership was
represented by a dummy variable whose reference category was private, non-profit hospital
ownership. The average penalty is the average penalty assessed over the 30-day RSMR
measurement period. Since payment adjustments under HRRP are applied annually,
operationalizing the variable for penalty required computing the average of the payment
adjustments applied during the three-year outcome measurement period. Since the mortality
measurement period corresponds to 12 quarters of payment adjustments, I computed the
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average penalty over 12 quarters. During the 2016 RSMR measurement period, maximum
penalties varied from 0% (for the first three months of the period before payment adjustments
were applied) to 3% during the final nine months of the measurement period. By the 2018
RSMR measurement period, maximum penalties varied from 2% (for the first three months of
the period before payment adjustments were applied) to 3% during the remainder of the
measurement period.
Other covariates represented hospital ownership, the duration for which the hospital’s
home state expanded Medicaid eligibility, teaching hospital status, county-level median
income, and county-level rates of private health insurance coverage, public health insurance
coverage, and poverty. To construct the variable for hospital ownership, I recoded hospitals
whose control codes were classified as “Government, Nonfederal” (state, county, city, citycounty, or hospital district or authority) as public. Those whose control codes were classified as
“Nongovernment, not-for-profit” (church-operated, other not-for-profit) were recoded as
private, non-profit (the reference group). Those whose control codes were classified as
“Investor-owned (for-profit)” (individual, partnership, corporation) were recoded as for-profit.
Since the number of states adopting Medicaid expansion increased during the period
corresponding to the outcome measures, the variable representing the duration of Medicaid
expansion in each hospital’s home state is a score ranging from 0 (expanded Medicaid was not
in place at all during the outcome measurement period) to 1 (Medicaid expansion was in place
during the entire outcome measurement period).
AHA considers hospitals that are members of the Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH)
of the Association of American Medical Colleges as major teaching hospitals. Since teaching
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hospital status may also vary during the period corresponding to the outcome measures,
hospitals were assigned the teaching hospital status in place at the mid-point of the mortality
measurement period. For hospitals classified as major teach hospitals, this variable was coded
as “yes” (reference value = no). Median income was divided by 1000 so that the coefficient
may be interpreted as change in RSMR for each $1,000 increase. The proportion of those in the
county with private health insurance coverage is the proportion of those with employer-based
coverage, directly purchased coverage, or Tricare/military coverage alone or in combination.40
The proportion of those with public health insurance coverage is the proportion of those in the
county with Medicaid/means-tested public coverage alone or in combination.41 The proportion
of those below the poverty level is the proportion of those in the county living below the
poverty level for the past 12 months.42
4.3.4 Analysis plan
First, I compared the characteristics of hospitals as well as average penalties and
national 30-day RSMR by ownership type and tested whether differences were significant.
These computations were followed by multiple linear regression analyses of 30-day RSMR on
the interaction of hospital ownership with average penalty for each condition by year. The
analyses were adjusted by teaching hospital status, Medicaid expansion duration, county-level
rates of public health insurance coverage, private health insurance coverage, poverty, and
county-level median income. Finally, I conducted fully adjusted multivariate linear regression
analysis with fixed effects to examine within hospital variation in RSMR by condition as a
function of the interaction of hospital ownership and penalty. The models include variables
representing fixed effects for each individual hospital (!! ), state ($" ), and the period for which
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mortality was measured (%# ). For all analyses, I used R version 3.6.1 with tidyverse (version
1.3.0), dplyr (version 1.0.2), and plm (version 2.4-3) packages.

4.4 Results
4.4.1 Comparison of hospital characteristics, penalties, and 30-day mortality, by ownership
type
Table 4.1 summarizes hospital characteristics. Among the 1,764 hospitals included in
the analysis, most (n=1,009) were private, non-profit hospitals (57.20%). For-profit institutions
represented 26.76% (n=472) of hospitals in the analysis followed by public hospitals (n=283;
16.04%). For almost all of the measures, there were significant differences among hospital
ownership types. Across all types, their status as major teaching hospitals changed little.
Although differences in the proportion of hospitals in each category classified as major teaching
hospitals were highly significant (p<0.001), the designation applied to relatively few hospitals.
From year to year, from two to three for-profit hospitals, 75 to 95 private hospitals, and 12 to
15 public hospitals had major teaching hospital status. The highest proportion of major
teaching hospitals were found among private hospitals (8.45%-9.99%). Beginning in 2014, the
ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility, providing states with full federal funding for expansion
during the first three years and covering at least 90% of expansion thereafter.43 Subsequently,
the number of states opting to expand coverage increased each year. The proportion of
hospitals located in a Medicaid expansion state increased over time across all hospital types. As
the years progressed, the proportion of private hospitals located in expansion states ranged
from 57.68% to 68.48%. The proportion of public hospitals located in expansion states was
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comparable to the proportion of for-profit hospitals (27.92% to 38.16% vs. 28.60% to 38.14%).
Differences in the proportion of hospitals located in a Medicaid expansion state were also
significant (p<0.001).
The counties where public hospitals were located had, on average, the highest rates of
public health insurance coverage and the lowest rates of private health insurance coverage. In
the counties where public hospitals were located, an average of 21.60% of residents were
covered, alone or in combination, by Medicaid or some other means-tested public health
insurance while 62.44% held private health insurance coverage. In counties where for-profit
hospitals and private hospitals were located, the average proportion of those with public health
insurance coverage was 20.42% and 20.19%, respectively. In counties where private hospitals
were located, 67.59%, on average, had private health insurance coverage while 63.21% of
residents had private health insurance coverage in counties that were home to for-profit
hospitals. Differences in rates of public health insurance coverage were significant at the
p<0.05 level while differences in private health insurance coverage were significant at the
p<0.001 level.
The counties where public hospitals were located also had, on average, the highest rates
of poverty and lowest median incomes. In those counties, 17.89% of residents on average lived
below the poverty rate and the median income averaged $50,472.71. Counties home to private
and for-profit hospitals had somewhat lower rates of poverty (14.89% and 16.51%,
respectively) and somewhat higher median incomes ($58,142.90 and $53,292.43, respectively).
Differences in both measures were significant at the p<0.001 level.
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As expected, average penalties were at their highest in 2017 when the maximum
penalty was in place. For public hospitals, average penalties ranged from a low of 0.28% of
Medicare reimbursement in 2014 to 0.60% in 2017. For private hospitals, the range was similar
(0.28%-0.63%). The lowest average penalty for-profit hospitals was slightly higher than that for
either of the other groups (0.30% of Medicare reimbursement) but reached 0.79% by 2017. In
2013 and 2014, differences in the average penalty were not significant but they were significant
(p<0.001) for each of the other years. Similarly, when the average penalty was computed, the
average penalty increased during each subsequent measurement period with the highest
average penalty observed among for-profit hospitals (0.66%) followed by private hospitals
(0.54%). Differences in average penalties were significant for each year (2016: p<0.01; 2017
and 2018: p<0.001).
The average national 30-day RSMR was consistently highest among public hospitals over
all conditions for all three years (the exception to this pattern occurred in 2016, when the
mortality rate for CABG among public hospitals (3.48%) dipped slightly below that for for-profit
hospitals (3.50%)). Since hospitals must have at least 25 initial hospitalizations for a diagnosis
to be measured, the number of hospitals eligible for inclusion varied by measure. There were
the fewest observations for CABG. Only slightly more than 16% of public hospitals, 36% of
private hospitals, and 30% of for-profit hospitals had observations for CABG. For all other
conditions, the number of observations was equal to or exceeded 50% of the hospitals in each
ownership category. Differences in the average national 30-day RSMR by hospital ownership
type were significant for all conditions every year.
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4.4.2 Multiple linear regression of 30-day mortality by condition and year on the interaction of
hospital ownership and average penalty
When examining the relationship between the interaction of hospital ownership with
average penalty and 30-day RSMR, the direction of the association varied from condition to
condition. Compared to private, non-profit ownership, for public hospitals each additional
percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with an increase in 30-day RSMR
for AMI and CABG across all years but the relationship was significant only for CABG in 2018. In
the case of AMI, effect sizes fluctuated: for public hospitals, an additional percentage point
increase in the penalty was associated with 0.28 percentage point increase in 30-day RSMR in
2016, dropping to a 0.15 point increase in 2017, and then rising again to a 0.39 point increase in
2018 (ns). CABG exhibited a similar pattern. In 2016, each percentage point increase in the
average penalty was associated with a 0.34 percentage point increase in CABG RSMR among
public hospitals, rising to 0.90 in 2017 (ns). By 2018, increase in the average penalty was
associated with 0.87 point increase in CABG RSMR among public hospitals (CI: 0.13, 1.43,
p<0.05).
The opposite was observed for COPD, heart failure, and pneumonia. For public
hospitals, increases in average penalty were associated with decreases in 30-day RSMR across
all years for all three conditions. Each percentage point increase in the average penalty was
associated with a 0.69 percentage point decrease in COPD RSMR in 2016, a 0.48 percentage
point decrease in 2017, and a 0.42 percentage point decrease in 2018 (ns). In the case of heart
failure, each percentage point increase in the average penalty among public hospitals was
associated with a 0.57 percentage point decrease in RSMR in 2016, a 0.49 percentage point
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decrease in 2017, and a 0.26 percentage point decrease in 2018 (ns). For pneumonia, increases
in average penalty was associated with 0.23 point decrease in RSMR in 2016, a 0.08 point
decrease in 2017, and a 0.05 point decrease in 2018 (ns).
Compared to private, non-profit ownership, for for-profit hospitals, each additional
percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with an increase in 30-day RSMR
for pneumonia across all years. This was significant only in 2016, when an additional
percentage point increase in the penalty was associated with 0.93 percentage point increase in
30-day RSMR (CI: 0.39, 2.02, p<0.01). For COPD and heart failure, there was an inverse
relationship between average penalty and RSMR. Among for-profit hospitals, each percentage
point increase in average penalty was associated with a decrease in COPD RSMR of from 0.42 to
0.63 percentage points (ns). For heart failure, the percentage point decrease in RSMR ranged
from 0.21 to 0.33 (ns).
For AMI and CABG, initial decreases in RSMR among for-profit hospitals were followed
by slight increases in 2018. For AMI, each percentage point increase in the average penalty was
associated with a 0.17 percentage point decrease in RSMR among for-profit hospitals in 2016
and a 0.05 point decrease in 2017 before rising to a 0.07 point increase in 2018 (ns). For CABG,
each percentage point increase in the average penalty was associated with a significant 0.65
percentage point decrease in RSMR among for-profit hospitals in 2016 (CI: 0.13, 1.43, p<0.05)
and a 0.35 point decrease in 2017 before rising to a 0.17 point increase in 2018 (ns).
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4.4.3 Multivariate linear regression of 30-day mortality by condition on the interaction of
hospital ownership and average penalty with fixed effects
Under the fixed effects model, the interaction of hospital ownership and average
penalty was significantly associated with 30-day RSMR only for publicly owned hospitals
following admission for CABG and heart failure. When compared to private, non-profit
hospitals, for public hospitals, each additional percentage point increase in average penalty was
associated with a 0.80 percentage point increase in CABG RSMR (CI: 0.24, 1.51, p<0.01) and a
0.51 point increase in heart failure RSMR (CI: 0.05, 0.94, p<0.05). For CABG, this is consistent
with the direction of the associations found under the previous model where there was a
positive correlation between average penalty and RSMR each year. However, the direction of
the effect of average penalty on heart failure RSMR is, under the fixed model, reversed. Under
the previous model, there was an inverse relationship between average penalty and heart
failure RSMR among public hospitals with the size of the reduction in RSMR diminishing from
2016 to 2018 (ns). While not significant for AMI, COPD, and pneumonia 30-day RSMR, the
directions of the associations found under the fixed effects models were also consistent with
those found under the previous model for the interaction of average penalty and public
hospital ownership (positive for AMI and negative for COPD and pneumonia).
For for-profit hospitals, the relationship between 30-day RSMR and the interaction with
average penalty as compared to private, non-profit hospitals did not reach significance for any
of the conditions under the fixed effects models. For AMI and CABG, average penalty was
associated with higher 30-day RSMR among for profit hospitals. For COPD, heart failure, and
pneumonia, average penalty was inversely associated with RSMR. For pneumonia, this
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represented a reversal of the relationships observed under the linear regression models for
each year.

4.5 Discussion
This study examined the interaction of hospital ownership and average penalty and its
association with 30-day RSMR through two models: 1) a multiple linear regression of 30-day
RSMR by condition for each year and 2) a multivariate linear regression of 30-day RSMR with
fixed effects. Some findings were consistent between the two models. The directions of the
associations were the same for the regression of AMI, CABG, COPD, and pneumonia 30-day
RSMR on the interaction of public hospital ownership and average penalty. When compared to
private, non-profit hospitals, the associations between average penalty and 30-day RSMR were
uniformly positive for AMI and CABG (significant in 2018 and under the fixed effects model) and
negative for COPD and pneumonia. In the case of heart failure RSMR, however, the direction of
the association reversed. Under the linear regression conducted for each year, there was an
inverse relationship between average penalty and heart failure RSMR among public hospitals
with the size of the reduction in RSMR diminishing from 2016 to 2018. Under the fixed effects
model, each additional percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with a
significant 0.51 point increase in heart failure RSMR.
Under both models, the interaction of average penalty and for-profit ownership was
consistent for COPD and heart failure where the associations between average penalty and 30day RSMR were uniformly negative. For AMI and CABG, initial decreases in RSMR observed
from year to year (significant for CABG RSMR in 2016) were followed by slight increases by
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2018. Under the fixed effects model, average penalty was positively correlated with AMI and
CABG RSMR among for-profit hospitals. In the case of pneumonia RSMR, the direction of the
association changed under the fixed effects model. Under the linear regression conducted for
each year, there was a positive relationship between average penalty and pneumonia RSMR
among for-profit hospitals with the size of the increase in RSMR diminishing from 2016 to 2018.
Under the fixed effects model, each additional percentage point increase in average penalty
was associated with a 0.06 point decrease in pneumonia RSMR.
While the associations between the interaction of hospital ownership with average
penalty and 30-day RSMR were rarely significant under either model, examining within-group
variation under the second model lent some reinforcement to correlational trends observed
from year to year. However, for heart failure, the relationship between average penalty and
RSMR among public hospitals was negative when examined by year but significantly positive
under the fixed effects model suggesting that failure to correct for time-invariant characteristics
may not sufficiently characterize the effect of penalization modified by hospital ownership on
30-day RSMR.
Heart failure have been the subject of a number of quality-of-care efforts focused on
better disease management.3,16,44–48 The first model showed that the interaction of both public
hospital ownership and for-profit hospital ownership with average penalty were associated
with lower 30-day heart failure RSMR as compared to private, non-profit hospitals when
examined by year with the size of the reduction in RSMR diminishing from 2016 to 2018.
Controlling for time-invariant characteristics, the direction of the association reversed for public
hospitals with average penalty associated with significant percentage point increase in RSMR.
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Even so, these findings may reflect professional initiatives and national efforts to promote
quality with synergistic effects on institutional efforts to improve care for heart failure.
Overall, though, the results raise questions about whether penalties under HRRP were
sufficient to influence care quality over time. Under HRRP, the size of the penalties was
relatively small with very few hospitals assessed the maximum penalty (among the hospitals
included in this study, the average penalty did not exceed 0.60% of Medicare reimbursement at
any time). It may be that penalties were not great enough to affect the resources available to
hospitals to make improvements in care quality that would be reflected in 30-day RSMR.
Alternatively, it may be that hospitals opted to scale down improvement efforts – whether or
not they faced penalties – when investments in quality were not sustainable.
How hospitals arrive at the determination that investments in quality are not
sustainable may differ by ownership type. If financial penalties are tolerable and they remain
comparable with other hospitals on measures of care quality (like 30-day RSMR), then for-profit
hospitals may determine that remaining competitive on measures is sufficient, even for
measures related to profitable procedures like CABG. Publicly owned hospitals, on the other
hand, may simply lack the resources to maintain quality initiatives (penalization was associated
with decreases in heart failure RSMR when examined by year but with a significant increase in
heart failure RSMR under the fixed effects model). In addition, the structure of HRRP puts
hospitals in a precarious position since CMS assesses hospital penalties based on a curve so, a
certain percentage of hospitals will always face penalties, regardless of improvements in
readmission rates.49 Under these circumstances, hospitals of all types may view ongoing
investments in care quality as futile.
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Limitations
The study relies on secondary data which were not gathered with this analysis in mind.
Penalties are applied annually while 30-day RSMR is based on data from index admissions over
a three-year period. To help address this, the primary predictor, average penalty, represented
the average of the penalties assessed over the 36 months coinciding with the outcome
measurement period. However, the outcome measure (30-day RSMR) may not be sufficiently
sensitive to improvements in care quality that may have been associated with HRRP penalties.
Also, under the study design, it is not possible to ascertain that the exposure (penalty) preceded
the outcome in a way that could suggest causality.50–53
Hospital ownership may be endogenous to the characteristics of the area in which a
hospital is located.5,21,23,54,55 If hospitals preferentially locate in certain areas and these areas
also have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. Similarly, if hospitals preferentially serve certain types of patients and these
patients have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. Both models include covariates representing area county-level characteristics and
the 2nd model includes fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics but it is possible
that these may not sufficiently manage endogeneity.
Confounding may have been a potential source of bias. While the models include an
array of covariates, it is possible that they are underspecified. If the unmeasured variables are
associated with mortality, then failure to control for them may overestimate any observed
association. Other investigators have included patient-level covariates in their analyses, but
findings are not consistent across studies. Papadogeorgou et al. included indicators for patient-
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level comorbidities in their study focusing on AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia and found that
the introduction of HRRP was not significantly associated with mortality following admission for
AMI and heart failure but was significantly associated with an increase in mortality following
pneumonia admission. Examining the same conditions, Gupta et al. found that HRRP
implementation was significantly associated with an increase in 30-day mortality following
hospitalization for pneumonia as well as heart failure but not for AMI.9 This study does not
include patient-level characteristics. Instead, it relies on county-level characteristics and
includes a variable representing the duration of Medicaid expansion in the state where the
hospital is located, an important indicator of the resources available to hospitals that may
offset penalties. Nevertheless, if the unmeasured variables are associated with mortality, then
failure to control for them may overestimate or mischaracterize any observed association. The
fixed effects model was applied to control for time-invariant characteristics and explore withinhospital variation.

4.6 Conclusion
This study examined the association between the national 30-day RSMR for AMI, heart
failure, COPD, CABG and pneumonia and the interaction of hospital ownership with penalties
assessed for readmission under HRRP. Its focus on the interaction distinguishes this study from
others examining the relationship between hospital ownership and quality of care, hospital
ownership and patient outcomes, and HRRP implementation and mortality.
While the associations between the interaction of hospital ownership with average
penalty and 30-day RSMR were rarely significant under either model, examining within-group
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variation under the second model lent some reinforcement to correlational trends observed
from year to year. However, for heart failure, the relationship between average penalty and
RSMR among public hospitals was negative when examined by year but significantly positive
under the fixed effects model suggesting that failure to correct for time-invariant characteristics
may not sufficiently characterize the effect of penalization modified by hospital ownership on
30-day RSMR.
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4.7 Tables and figures
Table 4-1. Comparison of penalized hospitals by hospital ownership type
Characteristic

Hospital ownership type
Private, non-profit

Public
n=283

For-profit

n=1009

n=472

Count

%

Count

%

Count

%

Teaching
hospital
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

15
14
13
13
12

5.66
5.11
4.92
4.96
4.86

95
91
94
75
78

9.96
9.46
9.99
8.45
9.18

3
2
2
3
2

1.00
<1.00
<1.00
1.00
<1.00

39.57***
41.03***
46.78***
32.10***
36.70***

Medicaid
expansion
state
2014
2015
2016
2017

79
92
108
108

27.92
32.51
38.16
38.16

582
678
691
691

57.68
67.20
68.48
68.48

135
159
180
180

28.60
33.69
38.14
38.14

150.13***
199.77***
160.94***
160.94***

Average
penalty
(annual)
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Test statistic
!!

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

n

mean

SD

283
283
283
283
283

0.29
0.28
0.47
0.48
0.60

0.35
0.38
0.52
0.52
0.69

1006
1009
1009
1009
1009

0.30
0.28
0.55
0.54
0.63

0.34
0.37
0.61
0.60
0.68

471
472
472
472
472

0.32
0.30
0.67
0.65
0.79

0.33
0.37
0.70
0.68
0.73

!!

3.29
4.25
16.50***
14.70***
26.12***

Average
penalty
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(RSMR
period)
2016
2017
2018

283
283
283

0.31
0.39
0.49

0.32
0.39
0.48

1006
1006
1009

0.33
0.43
0.54

0.34
0.44
0.54

471
471
472

0.37
0.51
0.66

0.33
0.45
0.56

12.70**
17.55***
26.98***
"

% with
private health
insurance
coverage
(county)

255

62.44

9.95

860

67.59

8.75

427

63.21

9.21

49.19***

% with public
health
insurance
coverage
(county)

255

21.60

7.53

861

20.19

6.51

425

20.42

6.68

3.68*

% below
poverty level
(county)

256

17.89

6.85

868

14.89

5.21

427

16.51

5.35

28.52***

Median
income
(county)

254

50,472.71

15,718.62

857

58,142.90

16,424.23

423

53,292.43

13,630.94

29.35***

163
153
149

14.33
13.87
13.62

1.20
1.22
1.33

833
821
806

13.96
13.48
13.09

1.28
1.24
1.22

333
324
319

14.25
13.72
13.29

1.22
1.13
1.13

10.43***
9.23***
11.28***

46
46
46

3.48
3.62
3.64

1.08
1.33
1.45

367
364
360

3.29
3.17
3.09

0.90
0.84
0.82

146
146
137

3.50
3.51
3.54

0.80
0.78
0.99

3.42*
10.73***
13.77***

262
253

8.22
8.24

1.10
1.15

978
970

8.04
8.03

1.20
1.14

423
416

8.00
8.00

1.21
1.19

3.42*
4.01*

Average 30day mortality
rate
AMI
2016
2017
2018
CABG
2016
2017
2018
COPD
2016
2017
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2018
Heart
failure
2016
2017
2018
Pneumo
nia
2016
2017
2018

250

8.54

1.15

968

8.36

1.19

411

8.32

1.20

3.07*

259
255
250

12.35
12.17
12.05

1.33
1.45
1.64

987
984
971

12.01
11.80
11.70

1.58
1.67
1.77

428
419
415

11.96
11.68
11.59

1.46
1.60
1.75

7.56***
8.61***
6.18**

274
271
267

16.87
16.45
16.36

2.33
2.13
2.03

996
990
983

16.23
15.87
15.74

2.15
2.06
2.11

435
428
423

16.55
16.19
16.11

2.43
2.13
2.08

9.53***
9.67***
11.35***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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Table 4-2 Multiple linear regression of 30-day RSMR on the interaction of hospital ownership and average penalty:
AMI 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

0.01

0.14

-0.27,
0.30

<-0.01

0.11

-0.22,
0.22

0.06

0.09

-0.12, 0.23

Public

0.24

0.17

-0.09,
0.57

0.25

0.17

-0.09,
0.58

0.24

0.18

-0.11, 0.59

For-profit

0.23

0.14

-0.04,
0.51

0.06

0.14

-0.22,
0.33

-0.03

0.14

-0.32, 0.25

Public*weighted
penalty

0.27

0.36

-0.44,
0.97

0.16

0.29

-0.40,
0.72

0.33

0.26

-0.17, 0.84

Forprofit*weighted
penalty

-0.18

0.28

-0.72,
0.36

-0.04

0.21

-0.45,
0.37

0.01

0.17

-0.33, 0.34

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.42**

0.14

-0.70, 0.14

-0.60***

0.13

-0.86, 0.33

-0.59***

0.14

-0.88, 0.31

Medicaid expansion
duration

-0.03

0.24

-0.49,
0.43

-0.15

0.14

-0.43,
0.13

-0.05

0.12

-0.29, 0.19

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

0.01

0.01

<-0.01,
0.03

0.01

0.01

-0.01,
0.03

<0.01

0.01

-0.02, 0.02

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

-0.02

0.01

-0.05,
0.01

-0.02

0.01

-0.04,
0.01

-0.03

0.01

-0.06,
<0.01

% below poverty
level (county)

0.01

0.01

-0.01,
0.04

0.01

0.01

-0.02,
0.03

<0.01

0.01

-0.03, 0.03

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.02, 0.01

-0.01***

<0.01

-0.02, 0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.03, 0.01

Average penalty
Ownership (ref =
Private, non-profit)

Interaction

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 4-3 Multiple linear regression of 30-day mortality on the interaction of hospital ownership and weighted
penalty: CABG 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

Average penalty

2018

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

0.07

0.18

-0.27,
0.42

0.10

0.13

-0.16,
0.36

0.09

0.11

-0.13, 0.31

Ownership (ref =
Private, non-profit)
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Public

<0.01

0.21

-0.41,
0.43

0.12

0.22

-0.32,
0.56

0.04

0.22

-0.82, 0.35

For-profit

0.29

0.15

<-0.01,
0.57

0.37*

0.15

0.08, 0.66

0.15

0.16

-0.17, 0.47

Public*weighted
penalty

0.17

0.55

-0.89,
1.28

0.80

0.45

-0.09,
1.69

0.78*

0.33

0.13, 1.43

Forprofit*weighted
penalty

-0.72*

0.32

-1.35, 0.09

-0.45

0.25

-0.93,
0.04

0.08

0.21

-0.33, 0.49

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.37**

0.12

-0.59, 0.14

-0.42***

0.11

-0.64, 0.20

-0.59***

0.12

-0.82, 0.35

Medicaid expansion
duration

-0.16

0.25

-0.64,
0.33

0.09

0.15

-0.21,
0.38

<0.01

0.13

-0.26, 0.26

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

0.01

0.01

-0.01,
0.03

0.01

0.01

-0.01,
0.03

0.01

0.01

-0.01, 0.03

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

-0.01

0.02

-0.04,
0.02

-0.02

0.02

-0.05,
0.01

-0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.02

% below poverty
level (county)

<0.01

0.02

-0.03,
0.03

0.01

0.02

-0.02,
0.04

<0.01

0.02

-0.03, 0.03

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.03, 0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.03, 0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.03, 0.01

Interaction

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 4-4 Multiple linear regression of 30-day mortality on the interaction of hospital ownership and weighted
penalty: COPD 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

-0.53***

0.13

-0.78, 0.28

-0.44***

0.10

-0.63, 0.26

-0.32***

0.08

-0.48, 0.17

Public

0.20

0.13

-0.05,
0.44

0.13

0.13

-0.12,
0.38

0.12

0.13

-0.14, 0.38

For-profit

-0.12

0.11

-0.35,
0.10

0.01

0.11

-0.21,
0.24

0.04

0.12

-0.19, 0.28

Public*weighted
penalty

-0.16

0.27

-0.68,
0.36

-0.04

0.22

-0.47,
0.39

-0.10

0.18

-0.47, 0.26

Forprofit*weighted
penalty

0.11

0.22

-0.33,
0.54

-0.19

0.17

-0.52,
0.14

-0.15

0.14

-0.43, 0.13

-0.21

0.13

-0.46,
0.05

-0.45***

0.13

-0.70, 0.21

-0.44**

0.14

-0.72, 0.17

Average penalty
Ownership (ref =
Private, non-profit)

Interaction

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)
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Medicaid expansion
duration

-0.19

0.20

-0.57,
0.20

-0.13

0.12

-0.36,
0.11

-0.08

0.10

-0.29, 0.13

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

0.02*

0.01

<0.01,
0.03

0.01

0.01

<0.01,
0.03

0.02*

0.01

<0.01, 0.03

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

<0.01

0.01

-0.02,
0.03

<0.01

0.01

-0.02,
0.02

-0.01

0.01

-0.03, 0.02

% below poverty
level (county)

-0.01

0.01

-0.03,
0.01

-0.02

0.01

-0.04,
0.01

-0.01

0.01

-0.03, 0.01

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.01***

<0.01

-0.02, 0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.02, 0.01

-0.02***

<0.01

-0.02, 0.01

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 4-5 Multiple linear regression of 30-day mortality on the interaction of hospital ownership and weighted
penalty: heart failure 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

-0.66***

0.15

-0.97, 0.36

-0.45***

0.13

-0.69, 0.20

-0.20

0.11

-0.42, 0.02

Public

0.21

0.15

-0.09,
0.51

0.32

0.17

-0.01,
0.65

0.43*

0.18

0.07, 0.78

For-profit

-0.19

0.14

-0.46,
0.08

-0.22

0.15

-0.52,
0.08

-0.06

0.17

-0.39, 0.27

Public*weighted
penalty

0.09

0.33

-0.55,
0.73

-0.04

0.29

-0.61,
0.53

-0.06

0.26

-0.56, 0.44

Forprofit*weighted
penalty

0.33

0.27

-0.21,
0.87

0.20

0.22

-0.24,
0.64

-0.01

0.20

-0.39, 0.38

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-0.96***

0.16

-1.27, 0.65

-1.12***

0.17

-1.45, 0.80

-1.33***

0.19

-1.71, 0.95

Medicaid expansion
duration

-0.29

0.24

-0.76,
0.18

-0.17

0.16

-0.49,
0.14

-0.01

0.15

-0.29, 0.28

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

0.05***

0.01

0.03,
0.07

0.05***

0.01

0.03, 0.07

0.06***

0.01

0.04, 0.08

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

<-0.01

0.01

-0.03,
0.03

0.01

0.02

-0.02,
0.05

0.01

0.02

-0.03, 0.04

% below poverty
level (county)

<-0.01

0.01

-0.03,
0.02

-0.02

0.01

-0.05,
0.01

-0.04*

0.02

-0.07, <0.01

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.03***

<0.01

-0.04, 0.02

-0.04***

<0.01

-0.05, 0.03

-0.05***

<0.01

-0.06, 0.04

Weighted penalty
Ownership (ref =
Private, non-profit)

Interaction
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Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 4-6 Multiple linear regression of 30-day mortality on the interaction of hospital ownership and weighted
penalty: pneumonia 30-day mortality by year
Covariates

Year
2017

2016

2018

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

Coefficient

SE

95% CI

-0.28

0.23

-0.74,
0.18

-0.01

0.17

-0.35,
0.32

0.10

0.14

-0.18, 0.38

Public

0.55*

0.23

0.10, 1.00

0.52*

0.22

0.09, 0.96

0.59**

0.22

0.15, 1.03

For-profit

-0.27

0.21

-0.69,
0.14

-0.08

0.20

-0.47,
0.31

-0.02

0.21

-0.43, 0.39

Public*weighted
penalty

0.05

0.49

-0.92,
1.01

-0.07

0.39

-0.83,
0.69

-0.15

0.32

-0.78, 0.48

Forprofit*weighted
penalty

1.21**

0.42

0.39, 2.02

0.50

0.30

-0.09,
1.08

0.27

0.25

-0.21, 0.76

Teaching hospital
(ref = no)

-1.07***

0.24

-1.55, 0.59

-1.02***

0.22

-1.46, 0.59

-1.03***

0.24

-1.51, -0.56

Medicaid expansion
duration

-0.66

0.37

-1.38,
0.06

-0.46*

0.21

-0.88, 0.05

-0.26

0.18

-0.61, 0.10

% with private health
insurance coverage
(county)

0.06***

0.01

0.03, 0.09

0.05***

0.01

0.02, 0.07

0.03*

0.01

0.01, 0.06

% with public health
insurance coverage
(county)

0.03

0.02

-0.01,
0.07

0.03

0.02

-0.02,
0.06

<0.01

0.02

-0.04, 0.04

% below poverty
level (county)

-0.04

0.02

-0.08,
<0.01

-0.03

0.02

-0.07,
<0.01

-0.05**

0.02

-0.09, -0.01

Median income
(county)/1000

-0.04***

0.01

-0.05, 0.03

-0.03***

0.01

-0.05, 0.02

-0.04***

0.01

-0.05, -0.03

Weighted penalty
Ownership (ref =
Private, non-profit)

Interaction

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

130

Table 4-7 Multivariate linear regression of the interaction of hospital ownership and average penalty on 30-day RSMR with fixed effects (fully adjusted)

AMI
Coefficient
(SE)
Average penalty

95% CI

CABG
Coefficient
(SE)

95% CI

COPD
Coefficient
(SE)

95% CI

Heart failure
Coefficient
(SE)

95% CI

Pneumonia
Coefficient
(SE)

95% CI

0.05 (0.10)

-0.14,
0.25

-0.07 (0.15)

-0.37,
0.22

-0.14 (0.09)

-0.31,
0.04

0.02 (0.11)

-0.20,
0.24

0.05 (0.14)

-0.22, 0.31

Public*average
penalty

0.43 (0.24)

-0.04,
0.89

0.87**(0.32)

0.24, 1.51

0.06 (0.18)

-0.29,
0.41

0.49* (0.23)

0.05,
0.94

-0.34 (0.27)

-0.86, 0.19

For-profit*average
penalty

-0.01 (0.16)

-0.32,
0.30

0.29 (0.21)

-0.12,
0.70

0.05 (0.13)

-0.21,
0.32

-0.17 (0.17)

-0.51,
0.16

-0.11 (0.21)

-0.51, 0.29

Interaction

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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5 Conclusion
This dissertation was intended to test the hypothesis that the association between
penalties assessed through HRRP payment adjustments and care quality (as measured by the
30-day RSMR for selected conditions of interest under HRRP: AMI, heart failure, pneumonia,
COPD, and CABG) varies by ownership. This project is distinguished from other research by its
focus on the relationship between penalties assessed under HRRP and 30-day risk standardized
mortality rate (RSMR) modified by hospital ownership.
Chapter 2 examined whether odds of exceeding the national 30-day RSMR for each
condition differed depending upon: 1) whether or not a hospital is penalized and 2) hospital
ownership type. Chapter 3 tested the association between penalization and 30-day RSMR for
each condition by year through multiple linear regression analysis stratified by hospital
ownership as well as through multivariate linear regression analysis with fixed effects to
examine change in RSMR over time by condition also stratified by hospital ownership. Finally,
Chapter 4 examined the interaction of hospital ownership with average penalty and its
association with 30-day RSMR through two models: 1) a multiple linear regression of 30-day
RSMR by condition for each year and 2) a multivariate linear regression of 30-day RSMR with
fixed effects.

5.1 Summary of findings
Multiple logistic regression showed that, with the exceptions of AMI and CABG in 2016
and 2018 and pneumonia in 2018, penalization was associated with a decrease in the odds of
exceeding the RSMR. However, the relationship was significant only for COPD in 2016, 2017,
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and 2018 and heart failure in 2016 and 2017. Hospital ownership, on the other hand, was
associated with increases in the odds of exceeding national 30-day RSMR for publicly owned
hospitals across all conditions and all years (except for COPD in 2018). When compared to
private, non-profit hospitals, the odds that a publicly owned hospital exceeded the national
RSMR were significant for AMI in 2016 and 2017, heart failure in 2017 and 2018, and
pneumonia in 2018. For-profit hospital ownership was more often associated with decreases in
the odds of exceeding the national RSMR but none of those were significant. However, forprofit hospital ownership was significantly associated with increases in the odds of exceeding
the national RSMR for CABG in 2017 and pneumonia in 2018.
Under the stratified multiple linear regression analyses, average penalties were
consistently associated with significant percentage point reductions in the average 30-day
RSMR for COPD over all measurement periods for all three types of hospital ownership. For
public and private hospitals, the reductions in 30-day RSMR associated with average penalty
declined steadily from 2016 to 2018 while, for for-profit hospital, the greatest percentage point
reduction was observed for the 2017 mortality measurement period. Average penalties were
also consistently associated with percentage point reductions in the average RSMR for heart
failure across hospital ownership types. Although not all of the associations were significant for
heart failure, reductions declined steadily from 2016 to 2018 for all three types of hospitals.
However, a significant percentage point increase in heart failure RSMR was observed under the
fixed effects model for public hospitals only suggesting that failure to correct for time-invariant
characteristics may not be sufficient to characterize the effect of penalties on 30-day RSMR
over time.
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Examining the interaction of hospital ownership and average penalty and its association
with 30-day RSMR through a multiple linear regression of 30-day RSMR by condition for each
year and a multivariate linear regression of 30-day RSMR with fixed effects found some
consistency between the two models. The directions of the associations were the same for the
regression of AMI, CABG, COPD, and pneumonia 30-day RSMR on the interaction of public
hospital ownership and average penalty. When compared to private, non-profit hospitals, the
associations between average penalty and 30-day RSMR were uniformly positive for AMI (ns)
and CABG (significant in 2018 and under the fixed effects model) and negative for COPD and
pneumonia (ns). In the case of heart failure RSMR, however, the direction of the association
reversed. Under the linear regression conducted for each year, there was an inverse
relationship between average penalty and heart failure RSMR among public hospitals with the
size of the reduction in RSMR diminishing from 2016 to 2018 (ns). Under the fixed effects
model, each additional percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with a
significant 0.51 point increase in heart failure RSMR.
The interaction of average penalty and for-profit ownership was not significant for any
of the conditions under the fixed effects model. Among for-profit hospitals, average penalty
was uniformly negatively associated with COPD and heart failure RSMR from year to year as
well as under the fixed effects model (ns). For AMI and CABG, initial decreases in RSMR
observed from year to year (significant for CABG RSMR in 2016) were followed by slight
increases by 2018 (ns).
That penalization was more often associated with a decrease in the odds of exceeding
the national 30-day RSMR provided some support for the premise underlying HRRP that
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incentives to reduce readmissions may motivate institutions to improve overall care quality.1
That public hospital ownership was so frequently associated with the odds of exceeding the
national 30-day mortality rate is consistent with other studies of the association between
hospital ownership and measures of care quality. Safety net hospitals, which include public
hospitals, often show poor performance on a number of the standard quality measures.2
Improving quality may require investing resources which public hospitals, as safety-net
institutions, lack.3 Safety net hospitals tend to have smaller gains in quality performance and
be less likely to be high-performing over time compared to non–safety net institutions.3
Stratification permitted further exploration of variations by hospital ownership and
echoed some of the findings observed under the logistic regression model. Consistent with
findings under the logistic regression model – which showed that penalization was significantly
associated with decreased odds of exceeding the RSMR for COPD – each percentage point
increase in average penalty was significantly associated with a percentage point decrease in
RSMR for COPD across all hospital types for all years. This finding, however, did not hold under
the stratified fixed effects model where increase in average penalty was associated with a nonsignificant percentage point increase in COPD RSMR among public hospitals. The logistic
regression model also showed that penalization was associated with decreased odds of
exceeding the RSMR for heart failure (significant in 2016 and 2017) which was consistent with
the stratified model showing that average penalty was associated with percentage point
decreases in RSMR each year for all hospital types. However, the fixed effects analysis stratified
by hospital ownership found that average penalty was associated with significant percentage
point increase in heart failure RSMR among public hospitals.
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While the association between the interaction of hospital ownership with average
penalty and 30-day RSMR was rarely significant under either of the analyses modeling the
interaction, examining within-group variation under the fixed effects lent some reinforcement
to correlational trends previously observed and suggested that failure to correct for timeinvariant characteristics may mischaracterize the effect of interactions on 30-day RSMR.
Findings related to heart failure RSMR, for example, showed that the relationship between
average penalty and RSMR among public hospitals was negative when examined by year but
was significantly positive under the fixed effects model.
Limitations
The study relied on secondary data which were not gathered with this analysis in mind.
Penalties are applied annually while 30-day RSMR is based on data from index admissions over
a three-year period. To help address this, the primary predictor, average penalty, represented
the average of the penalties assessed over the 36 months coinciding with the outcome
measurement period. However, the outcome measure may not be sufficiently sensitive to
improvements in care quality that may have been associated with HRRP penalties.
Also potentially problematic was the introduction of COPD into the HRRP in 2015. The
introduction of COPD into HRRP applied to all hospitals participating in the program. During the
2016 RSMR measurement period, COPD was part of the HRRP readmission measure for nine of
36 months (25% of the measurement period). This increased to 21 months (58.33%) during the
2017 RSMR measurement period and to 33 months (91.67%) during the 2018 RSMR
measurement period. This means that it may not be possible to make meaningful comparisons
of results from year to year.
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Confounding may also have been a potential source of bias. While the models include
an array of covariates, it is possible that they are underspecified. If the unmeasured variables
are associated with mortality, then failure to control for them may overestimate any observed
association. While other investigators have included patient-level covariates in their analyses,
findings are not consistent across such studies. This study does not include patient-level
characteristics. Instead, it relies on county-level characteristics and includes a variable
representing the duration of Medicaid expansion in the state where the hospital is located, an
important indicator of the resources available to hospitals that may offset penalties.
Hospital ownership may also be endogenous to the characteristics of the area in which a
hospital is located.5,21,23,59,60 If hospitals preferentially locate in certain areas and these areas
also have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. Similarly, if hospitals preferentially serve certain types of patients and these
patients have unobserved characteristics that affect the outcome, then hospital ownership is
endogenous. To address this, the logistic regression models include covariates representing
area county-level characteristics but it is possible that these may not sufficiently manage
endogeneity.

5.2 Reflection
Findings in chapter 3, which found that the average penalty was significantly associated
with decreases in RSMR for COPD across all hospital types for all years, initially reinforced
results from the logistic regression model which found penalization significantly associated with
a decrease in the odds of exceeding the RSMR. While not as consistently significant, comparing
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results under the logistic regression and the stratified linear models for some other conditions,
like heart failure, suggested that perhaps some conditions were more responsive than others to
quality initiatives motivated by penalties. Tests of the interaction of hospital ownership with
average penalty rarely demonstrated that the association between penalization and RSMR
varied significantly by ownership type. Analyses employing fixed effects also suggested that
failure to control for time-invariant characteristics may mischaracterize the effect of penalties
on 30-day RSMR when examined over time.
In Chapter 4, the linear regression conducted for each year showed an inverse
relationship between average penalty and heart failure RSMR among public hospitals with the
size of the reduction in RSMR diminishing from 2016 to 2018. Under the fixed effects model,
each additional percentage point increase in average penalty was associated with a significant
0.51 point increase in heart failure RSMR. This raises questions about the extent to which
changes care quality in response to HRRP may be sustained over time. This dissertation focuses
on the early years of HRRP spanning from the last few months in 2012 before penalties started
to phase in to 2017 which was only the third year that maximum penalties were in effect. Over
the 2016 RSMR measurement period, the maximum average penalty was 1.75% of Medicare
reimbursement. That increased to 2.5% during the 2017 RSMR measurement period and 2.92%
during the 2018 period. However, under HRRP, the size of the penalties was relatively small
with very few hospitals assessed the maximum penalty – among hospitals included in this
study, the average penalty across the RSMR measurement periods did not exceed 0.60%.
Initially, the introduction of penalties was accompanied by swift reductions in readmissions.4,5
These slowed and approached the baseline trend by 2016 suggesting that, even then,
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readmission reductions were nearing a floor.4,5 If so, then improvements in care quality
undertaken in response to HRRP may have quickly reached a point of diminishing returns. The
design of HRRP, which imposed penalties on hospitals that performed worse than their peer
institutions regardless of whether or not they themselves have improved, may have rendered
efforts to chase ever-diminishing readmission rates futile and, potentially, dangerous when
some readmissions are necessary.
There are countless measures of quality and performance imposed by CMS as well as
others which, as they have proliferated, impose substantial burdens on health systems and
health care providers.4,6 The opportunity costs associated with both measurement and
activities to improve performance on measures (if not the underlying root causes of poor
performance) may make it challenging for hospitals to meet other needs.7 The costs of quality
improvement initiatives should be regularly evaluated against their benefits with attention to
how the impacts may vary across institutions and how such variation may influence health
equity. As Chhabra and colleagues write, it is not sufficient to assess whether a policy achieved
its intended goals but rather to examine whether even successful policies should continue. A
study similar to the one described in this dissertation but covering an extended period of time
may shed additional light on whether HRRP will continue to achieve improvements in
readmission without adverse consequences.
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